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Introduction
More than ever, city governments are struggling to address the pressures that growing
populations have introduced, ranging from housing shortages to unmanageable traffic
congestion, overwhelmed public transit systems, and health crises exacerbated by densely
populated communities. In turn, municipal governments themselves have continued to expand,
adding new offices and staff members to manage these urban crises and address the growing
demand for city services. One recent innovation from the social science world that holds the
potential to improve the lives of urban dwellers and improve their governments is a behavioral
intervention called a nudge.1 In simple terms, a nudge can refer to any deliberate attempt to
influence an individual’s decision without limiting their options. Policy makers can nudge
citizens by giving them more information about their options, informing them about their
neighbors’ or peers actions, or adjusting what legal scholar Cass Sunstein refers to as ‘choice
architecture” and removing friction from an individual’s decision.2
Nudges have the potential to steer individuals in the “right” direction without using
monetary incentive or restrictive bans to force their hand. Yet, nudges risk violating the
autonomy of nudged citizens. As this thesis argues, cities offer the greatest potential for nudges.
Cities have a narrower profile of citizens and a more uniform set of policy concerns, which allow
city officials to take advantage of frequent opportunities to interact with citizens and implement
widely applicable nudges. Meanwhile, cities also present the most tractable context for
addressing critics’ concerns about nudges—that they are antidemocratic and threaten autonomy.

Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness: Rev. and
Exp. Ed (New York: Penguin, 2009).
2 Pierre Schlag, “Nudge, Choice Architecture, and Libertarian Paternalism” (April 6, 2010). Michigan Law Review,
Vol. 108, pp. 913-924, 2010; U of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-14. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1585362
Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein and John P. Balz, “Choice Architecture” (April 2, 2010). Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1583509 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1583509
1
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Large populations of underinformed, non-consenting subjects exacerbate the antidemocratic and
autonomy-undermining tendencies of the most intrusive nudges, and city governments are best
able to combat these risks by narrowly tailoring nudges to the democratic will of their residents.
Moreover, cities are small enough to facilitate inclusive conversations around nudges and get
their citizens’ feedback on the ethical and transparency requirements that cities should place on
nudge units. Up to this point, there is little evidence of cities engaging in this work, and
academics and third-party behavioral consultants have primarily driven the agenda of municipal
nudge units. However, it is not too late to change this paradigm, and understanding the early
history of nudge units could help citizens and their public officials break through the complexity
of behavioral interventions to play a more active role in shaping them.
Initially, this project emerged from a curiosity about the 2008 book Nudge’s rise to
prominence across academic, political, and social circles in Washington D.C. and across the
country. Even before winning the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2017, Richard Thaler had
successfully introduced nudges to the public, doing interviews on NPR and giving a Google talk
on “The Behavioralizing of Economics” in 2015. Even where Thaler was not directly involved in
the conversation, nudge units captured popular interest in forums like the podcast Freakonomics,
which has a ‘nudge unit’ tag for several of its episodes that delve into the subject.3 While it is not
uncommon for academics, especially economists, to introduce new concepts into the political

Richard Thaler, "The Behaviorializing of Economics: Why Did It Take So Long?". Lecture, Talks at Google,
Cambridge, MA, December 9, 2015. https://talksat.withgoogle.com/talk/the-behavioralizing-of-economics
See also: Freakonomics podcasts tagged ‘Nudge Unit’ or ‘Behavioral Economics’:
https://freakonomics.com/podcast-tag/nudge-unit/
https://freakonomics.com/podcast-tag/behavioral-economics/
Richard Thaler, interview with Guy Raz, “What is a Nudge?” TED Radio Hour, NPR, podcast audio, June 24, 2016,
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/483112809
Richard Thaler, interview with Kenny Malone and Jacob Goldstein, “Episode 803: Nudge, Nudge, Nobel,” Planet
Money, NPR, podcast audio, November 1, 2017, https://www.npr.org/transcripts/561425610
3
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lexicon, nudges’ expansion into the political sphere has not necessarily led to politicians
championing nudges directly by launching nudges themselves. Rather, the third-party
consultancy that launched Britain’s nudge unit, the Behavioral Insights Team, and the nonprofit
Ideas42 have remained the leading shepherds of nudge into city politics. Staff members from
those two organizations, along with affiliated academics, are the primary overseers of nudges in
a municipal context. At the same time, charitable organizations like Bloomberg Philanthropies
play a large role in funding nudge units, which suggests that nudge units could face an incentive
to serve the interests and political agendas of the third-party organizations needed to support
their work, rather than the citizens who are supposedly the beneficiaries of nudge units. This
unique positioning of municipal nudge units, as public-private partnerships whose activities tend
to fly under the radar externally even while they generate confusion internally, makes them a
worthy subject of study.
In this study, Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the academic theory underlying nudge, centered
around the eponymous 2008 book by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. Written for a wide
audience, Nudge touches on the history and the potential applications of behavioral economics
theories to the more practical realm of politics. Outside of Nudge, Sunstein has written multiple
defenses of nudge from a legal, ethical, and practical standpoint, often in scholarly conversation
with the academics who critique his and Thaler’s work. Chapter 2 explores these critiques and
Sunstein’s defense in order to make the case that nudges are not intrinsically unethical, though
they can violate citizens’ autonomy if left unchecked.
Chapters 3 and 4 trace the early applications of nudge to politics through offices called
nudge units. Chapter 3 details the history of a several nudge units at different scales, starting with
a federal office based in the UK, and Chapter 4 focuses on how nudge units fit into the arc of city
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politics. By situating nudge units amongst the history of municipal politics, Chapter 4 argues that
cities are the ideal platform to implement nudges because they align with cities goals to
implement policies that are low-cost, easily scalable, apolitical, and malleable to the city’s
specific needs. Using the behavioral design teams (BDTs) of New York City, Chicago, and
Philadelphia as primary examples, Chapter 4 argues that the nudge units of American
municipalities are shaped primarily by the nonprofits that fund their creation and the behavioral
science consultancies that staff their offices and design their projects. While each behavioral
design team studied has taken on unique projects reflective of the three cities’ respective
struggles, they are similar in their objectives, design processes, and reliance on academics.
Chapter 6 takes on the evolving role of nudges in the context of the smart city. Given that
nudges inherently aspire to change behavior, the more data about human activity that policy
architects have access to, the more widely and accurately nudges can be designed. However, the
introduction of big data threatens to exacerbate the most intrusive aspects of municipal nudges.
Particularly when it comes to urban data that can collect information on the movement of people
and goods via sensors, there is typically minimal citizen consent and understanding about what
information is being collected. Given that civic data trusts have only recently been proposed by
Google-funded venture Sidewalk Labs for its Toronto project, it is unlikely that smaller efforts to
match urban data collection with nudge unit initiatives have implemented similar ethical
standards. Creating democratic standards that would genuinely address the ethical concerns
posed by academics like Sofia Ranchordás would require community input and lengthy debates
that are only now beginning to take place in Toronto with the support of Sidewalk Labs. 4

On May 7, 2020, Sidewalk Labs announced that it was cancelling its plans to redevelop the Quayside
neighborhood of Toronto. However, the past two and a half years of progress Sidewalk Labs achieved with its
public partner Waterfront Toronto should serve as a model for complex public-private partnerships, even if for the
4
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After suggesting that intertwining urban data collection efforts with municipal nudges poses a
greater threat to individuals’ privacy and autonomy than do traditional nudges, Chapter 6 makes
a case for nudge units to make explicit their ethical standards, metrics for success and
mechanisms for oversight and evaluation.
The nudge units explored in Chapters 4 and 5 and analyzed in Chapters 6 and 7 reveal
ambitious goals and promising progress for nudges, but few opportunities for unaffiliated
academics or third-party auditors to evaluate their success. Although the initial aim for this
project was to evaluate America’s municipal nude units in detail and draw conclusions about
why specific projects were more successful than others, the lack of publicly available data sets
and absence of independent reviews on these efforts made this task unrealistic. Instead of
evaluating the behavioral design strategies and characteristics of nudge units that align with
successful outcomes, this thesis seeks to understand the goals that these units have set for
themselves and offer several alternatives for ethical and empirical standards that could guide
them in the future. Without arguing that one guiding philosophy for behavioral interventions is
the right fit for any particular city, this thesis demonstrates that there are enough unanswered
questions surrounding nudge units and their scope to merit greater citizen engagement around
nudge units. Because nudge units are new and relatively unheard of, they do not attract activists,
reformers, and engaged citizens to the same degree as issues like criminal justice, housing, and
education, citizens are being left out of a conversation they do not even realize is happening.
While nudges do not expend a large amount of a city’s resources compared to to these other
policy areas, the fact that they wield relatively unchecked influence over many policy domains

sake of critiquing it. Sidewalk Labs’ community forums, physical visitor space, and 1,500-page Master Innovation
and Development Plan
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should inspire a desire amongst citizens to understand how nudge units work and whether they
are accomplishing their goals.
Although understanding the public-nonprofit partnerships behind America’s municipal
nudge units is the core goal of this thesis, it is worth noting that there are several other models
driving municipal nudges, mainly university-affiliated research institutes and private contractors.
Interspersed amongst the stories and websites of the established BDTs discussed thus far are
several other behavioral policy implementations originating from universities and the private
sector. The What Works Cities Certification Standard Committee, for example, has several
members from these sectors.5 From the private sector side, Deloitte is one example of a private
consulting firm with a webpage dedicated to discussing behavioral design in cities. Although
Deloitte does not generally disclose its clients, Deloitte has published several reports detailing
institutional knowledge about smart mobility and the means by which big data and information
technology are being used to “better manage urban assets.”6 Deloitte affirms the central insight
of choice architecture, “that minor, often inexpensive tweaks to choice environments can wield
outsized effects on people’s actions,” and suggests that cities can become smarter rethinking the
design of everyday systems. Likewise, McKinsey and Accenture have teams focused on
behavioral insights, and technology companies like IBM, Palentir, and Alphabet (via Sidewalk
Labs) have grown increasingly involved in implementing smart-city solutions and nudges for

The WWC Committee includes including Bill Eggers, the Executive Director of Deloitte’s Center for Government
Insights; Stephen Goldsmith, the Director of the Innovations in Government Program at Harvard Kennedy School of
Government (overseer of Data-Smart City Solutions); and Neil Kleiman, the Director of the New York University
Wagner Innovation Labs;, and Beth Blauer, the Executive Director of the Center for Government Excellence
(GovEx) at Johns Hopkins University.
See: “Meet the What Works Cities Certification Standard Committee,” Medium (What Works Cities, January 25,
2018), https://medium.com/what-works-cities-certification/meet-the-what-works-cities-certification-standardcommittee-524ed1394c74.
6 Eggers, William D., Jim Guszcza and Michael Greene. 2017. “Making Cities Smarter.” Deloitte Insights, January
23, 2017, available at https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/deloittereview/issue-20/people-for-smarter-citiescollective-intelligence-decision-making.html
5
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cities.7 Wherever academics or private corporations are driving municipal behavioral
interventions, citizens should be equally as curious and skeptical about their methods and
intentions as they are of behavioral design consultancies’, but academic institutes and corporate
behavioral science initiatives are not the focus of this thesis because they are not nearly as
involved in behavioral interventions at the municipal scale.
Regardless of who is responsible for a nudge’s design and implementation, all
government-sponsored behavioral interventions require the continued cooperation of public
sector partners, who are presumably held accountable for their success by voters. However,
leaving academic and private-sector experts in charge of municipal nudge units allows for the
possibility that neither citizens nor public officials will fully understand the design,
implementation, and implication of nudges deployed in their cities. Although these private sector
corporations serve public sector clients who wish to implement nudges, they are not drivers of
the political behavior change revolution to the same extent that the nonprofit and social-purpose
consultancies are. Moreover, their unwillingness to disclose their clients would make an analysis
of their work with cities cursory at best and impossible at worst. Instead, the development of
cities’ partnerships with ideas42 and the Behavioral Insights Team best reveals the evolution of
nudges in the urban context is traced through, along with one attempt to launch an independent
behavioral science initiative in Philadelphia. Nonetheless, the discussions throughout this thesis
concerning the ethics of nudging, the scope of nudge policies in cities, and the changing

Robert Brauneis and Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City (August 2, 2017). 20 Yale J.
of Law & Tech. 103 (2018); GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper.
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3012499 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3012499
7

Shannon Mattern, “Where Code Meets Concrete,” Urban Omnibus, September 4, 2019,
https://urbanomnibus.net/2019/09/where-code-meets-concrete/.
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landscape of nudge with the introduction of smart city innovations, should be equally applicable
to conversations around private and academic-led nudge initiatives.
When it comes to reflecting on the past ten years of municipal experiments with nudges
and plotting out the next ten years, the key pieces to understand are precisely these three areas:
the ethical arguments for and against government-sponsored behavioral interventions, empirical
evidence about their success, and the potential scope of nudges informed by big data. Clearly, the
concept has bloomed far beyond the initial design of Nudge, and the practical manifestations of
the theory are now far outside of the control of Sunstein and Thaler, so it is up to engaged
citizens and critical academics to check the actions of municipal nudge units and ensure that they
are accomplishing worthy goals without violating citizens’ rights.
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Chapter 1: The Idea
Before there were nudge units, there was Nudge. The book, released in 2008 by
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, builds upon two decades of behavioral economics
research by incorporating theories of human biases and choice making tendencies into policy
applications. Without understanding Thaler and Sunstein’s theory of libertarian paternalism
and their pitch to policy makers across the world, it would be impossible to understand the
guiding strategy and objectives of nudge units at work in cities today. The basic idea of
behavioral economics is that humans are not always the rational actors that classical
economics purports them to be. Behavioral interventions take emotions, social influence, and
general irrationalities into account to set up individuals’ choice alternatives in such a way
that steers people toward making the decision that maximizes utility for themselves or for
society.
The foundational behavioral economics theories based on the power of observed
heuristics, framing effects, and defaults challenge many traditional economic assumptions,
and the psychologists like Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman who initially proposed them
faced significant pushback. 8 Once their ideas were accepted by psychologists and
economists, behavioral economics became a more widely accepted field of study and
academics could specializing even more narrowly in behavioral design in medicine, law,
policy, and markets. To fully absorb the influence of nudge units and their unique role as
executors of an applied political theory with empirical roots, it is worth contextualizing
nudge in the recent history of behavioral economics. At one level, regulating nudge units
could involve preferencing certain types of nudges over others, which would require a deep

Michael Lewis, The Undoing Project: A Friendship That Changed Our Minds (Waterville, ME: Thorndike Press, a
part of Gale, Cengage Learning, 2017).
8
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understanding of the range of nudges and how they work in practice. For the purposes of
distinguishing between nudges, it is most helpful to consider what type of irrationality the
nudge addresses, what type of behavioral intervention mechanism the nudge relies on, and
whether the nudge affects individuals’ conscious or subconscious (System 1 or System 2)
thinking.
Chief among the irrationalities discussed in Nudge are inaccurate perceptions of risk,
anchoring tendencies, the availability heuristic, the representativeness heuristic, status quo
bias, and herd mentality. Many of these phenomena have direct links to the nudge policies
that drive behavioral design units today, which seek to influence people by adjusting their
choice architecture, rather than their incentives. Whether the issue is low voter turnout or a
lack of diversity in applicants to a public office, Thaler and Sunstein believe that behavioral
scientists and policy-makers can and should collaborate to revise the choice-making
framework that allows many individuals to act against their own (or society’s) best interests.
To use nudges to catalyze behavior changes, Thaler advocates for the EAST approach, which
advises designing nudges that make the socially optimal choice Easy, Attractive, Social, and
Timely. Generally, nudges touch on at least one of these categories by harnessing the power
of defaults, reducing the ‘hassle factor’ of taking up a service, attracting attention or
designing rewards and sanctions for maximum effect, using the power of networks, and
encouraging people to make a commitment to others. 9 Chapter 3 expands upon the EAST
philosophy in the context of the UK’s nudge unit.

Owain Service, David Halpern, and Michael Hallsworth, “EAST: Four Simple Ways to Apply Behavioural
Insights,” The Behavioural Insights Team, July 2015, https://www.bi.team/publications/east-four-simple-ways-toapply-behavioural-insights/)
9
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Why Nudges?
Apart from touting the unique potential of using our expanding understanding of
human behavior to intervene in human behavioral patterns, nudge advocates have ascribed a
certain moral superiority to behavioral interventions over what they consider to be more
normative policy measures. Namely, nudge advocates point to outright bans or mandates as
more directly, and therefore less justifiably, interfering with the lives of citizens because such
measures limit their choices. Similarly, incentives and disincentives promise monetary gains
to citizens who do as the government prefers, manipulating citizens’ choices with the greatest
effect on society’s most vulnerable that are in the worst position to turn down the money.
Thaler and Sunstein introduce the concept of nudges with the hypothetical example of
a school cafeteria. Knowing that the placement of foods influences the likely selections of
unsuspecting children—according to the book, one can increase or decrease the consumption
of many food items by as much as 25 percent via placement decisions—Thaler and Sunstein
ask how a prudent administrator would choose to organize food items along the lunch line.
An administrator must decide what is fair, or wise, or optimal in this case, while also
deciding whether to tell students about the rationale for the eventual layout. Arranging the
food randomly, however illogical, would be the only approach that could truly be considered
laissez faire, allowing the administrator to claim that she did not seek to interfere with or
otherwise influence students’ choices in the slightest. As Sunstein and Thaler imagine even a
libertarian would admit, putting peanut butter and jelly on opposite sides of a cafeteria
simply to preserve the autonomy of school children reflects poor decision making; their next
question would be to ask whether the administrator should intervene to reorganize the
cafeteria. The remaining potential options align with objectives of maximizing the cafeteria’s
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profits, maximizing profits by seeking kickbacks from providers she can favor via product
placement, optimizing students’ health outcomes, or seeking an arrangement that would
leave kids inclined to pick the items they would choose on their own. Here, Thaler and
Sunstein begin to argue for the book’s thesis that allowing, if not encouraging, the
administrator to sort the food items in such a way as to optimize student’s health outcomes is
both ideal and justified. In doing so, the administrator becomes a “choice architect,” a label
that Thaler and Sunstein assign to any individual that “has the responsibility for organizing
the context in which people make decisions.” 10 Part of the reason Thaler and Sunstein
embrace this label is that choice architects, like actual architects, face the reality that “there is
no such thing as a ‘neutral’ design.” Given the inevitable choice to approve some design,
policy makers will be interfering with their constituents’ positive freedom regardless of how
they choose to preference a certain process or system.11
Throughout Nudge, Thaler and Sunstein present examples of dozens of choice
architects, from the Dutch authorities who supported the etching of black house flies into
urinals to encourage men to aim wisely, to university administrators’ decision to change the
default selection for university employees’ health insurance and retirement plans. In many
cases, the nudges Thaler and Sunstein propose are theoretical, diagnosing irrationalities in the
market and in public policy that they believe can be redressed with nudges in the right
direction. While the settings discussed are diverse, and the proposed nudge instigators range
from employers to professors to public officials, all nudges leverage behavioral insights to
encourage behavior change without in any way requiring or directly incentivizing it. Like
advertising, nudges rely upon influence rather than coercion.

10
11

Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 3.
Ibid.
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Alongside this mechanical explanation of nudges and their potential to affect great
influence, Thaler and Sunstein touch on the philosophical underpinning of their interferencebased model. Calling this philosophy libertarian paternalism, Thaler and Sunstein make two
tenets the centerpieces of their theory: 1) “people should be free to do what they like--and to
opt out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so,” and 2) “it is legitimate for choice
architects to try to influence people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier,
and better.”12 With these two opinions guiding their approach to policymaking, Thaler and
Sunstein combine aspects of traditional liberal and conservative ideas of public policy. By
demonstrating that individuals often make decisions that serve their interests poorly, Thaler
and Sunstein depart from the conservative mindset that people should be left largely to their
own devices when it comes to personal decisions about health, education, and investment.13
By demonstrating that there is a less intrusive alternative to prohibiting an action or directly
changing economic incentives, Thaler and Sunstein distinguish nudges from more dramatic
liberal welfare policies.14 As Thaler and Sunstein repeat time and again, “to count as a mere
nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid.”15
As evidence of poor choices, Thaler and Sunstein refer to obesity, low savings rates,
and truancy rates that reflect an irrefutable disconnect between individuals’ best interests and
their unencumbered actions. And yet, Thaler and Sunstein question the effectiveness of sin
taxes, social security taxes, and other policies that fall into the category of direct incentives,
mandates, and prohibitions. By limiting the free will of citizens, they remove the options that

Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 5.
Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, “Libertarian Paternalism,” 93 Am Econ Rev, 175 (2003).
13 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 93.
14 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 9.
15 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 6.
12
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are believed to be individually or societally harmful, but they also rid citizens of the
opportunity to make their own calculation about whether engaging in the behavior is
worthwhile.
Nudges are simple, by design, and they revolve around a few key insights, many of
which involve systematic errors in human behavior. The “planning fallacy,” for one, reflects
“the systematic tendency toward unrealistic optimism about the time it takes to complete
projects.”16 The “status quo bias,” for another, is an academic’s interpretation of behavioral
inertia--essentially, people are most likely to continue an established behavior or reaffirm a
past decision without considering alternatives. 17 The status quo bias helps to explain the
power of defaults, which consumers tend to reify by neglecting to place effort in seeking to
change the option chosen by a boss, a company, or even the government.
To unpack irrationalities necessitating nudges from a different angle, Thaler and
Sunstein also refer to the work of Kahneman and Tversky regarding systems thinking.
Comparing Systems 1 and 2, or the Automatic System and the Reflective System as Thaler
and Sunstein prefer to call them, allows us to distinguish between the intangible parts of the
brain that handle effortless, associative, or unconscious decision making versus decision
making that is controlled, self-aware, and slow. Even if individuals can be made aware of and
compelled to counteract their biases such as the status quo bias or the planning fallacy, it is
more difficult to redress irrationalities so deeply seated as their subconscious reliance on the
Automatic System when the work of the Reflective System would better serve their
interests.

16
17

Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 7.
Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 34.
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A third culprit of irrational behavior, relying on heuristics masked as “rules of
thumb,” encompasses errors made by an overreliance on anchoring, the availability bias, and
the representativeness bias. People often make decisions or estimations influenced by a
misleading anchor point, an irrelevant but conveniently available data point, or a less-thanhelpful bit of information guised as a proxy for the actual answer. Nonetheless, people fall
victim to these biases more often than they would care to admit. In many situations,
individuals’ optimism or overconfidence misleads them into believing that they are the
outlier or the exception to the rule. Furthermore, people have quirky, insurmountable
tendencies like an outsized aversion to losses relative to the positive reaction they feel from
opposite gains.18 All of these behavioral quirks help to explain why the “rational (wo)man”
does not always behave rationally. People avoid saving, refuse opportunities for preventative
treatment and diagnostic tests, and thwart risks with positive expected values, often because
the instincts baked into their Automatic System overwhelm the slower but wiser calculations
of their Reflective System. In these explanations for human irrationality, though, Sunstein
and Thaler see hope, since it is these same quirks that informed the design of their antidotes-nudges.
With the starting point of fallibility, and the assumption that it can be understood with
a critical approach to behavioral tendencies, Thaler and Sunstein delve into several
applications. To overcome temptation and the near universal challenge of self-control,
Thaler and Sunstein offer the examples of Daylight Savings Time and the Christmas savings
clubs of days past. The frame of an extra hour of daylight inspired greater productivity, while
the frame of a self-imposed mandate on saving gave many the nudge they needed to set aside

18

Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 33-35.
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enough savings throughout the year for Christmas gifts. Whether the motivations are
internally affirmed, or externally produced via social influences like information, peer
pressure, and priming, there is often room for nudges to intervene in people’s irrational
behaviors.
When it comes to categorizing the situations where nudges are most warranted,
Thaler and Sunstein establish the criteria that nudges ought to address “decisions that are
difficult and rare, for which [people] do not get prompt feedback, and when they have trouble
translating aspects of the situation into terms they can easily understand.”19 The realm of
personal finance, which satisfies these criteria, is a focal point of nudging for Thaler and
Sunstein, who see low savings rates as an avoidable irrationality breeding financial insecurity
for many Americans. To address it, Thaler and Sunstein propose automatic enrollment in
savings plans, and the Save More Tomorrow program.20 Defaulting employees into savings
plans, while retaining the option to opt-out, can encourage significant numbers of people to
honor the default and save more than they otherwise would have, a benefit often
compounded by their employers’ matching policies.21 To interfere less aggressively,
employers could simply require employees to make a decision in the first place, rather than
allowing them to neglect the choice. Putting individuals in the position to actively reject a
savings plan makes them more likely to opt-in.22 Approaching the issue of savings from a
deeper psychological level, Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi’s Save More Tomorrow program is
designed to allow participants “to commit themselves, in advance, to a series of contribution

Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 73.
Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 104.
21 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 109.
22 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 110.
19
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increases timed to coincide with pay raises.”23 By pegging contribution rates to raises,
participants can minimize the extent to which they “feel” the increase, since those increases
will be cushioned by the fact that their take-home pay has also grown.24
In the realm of health policy, Thaler and Sunstein’s proposed nudges rely more
heavily on social influence rather than defaults. The general issue nudges seek to address in
healthcare is to engage with the healthcare system in the first place, which individuals are
more likely to do when they see their peers or people with a similar profile engage with the
healthcare system. As an example, Nudge suggests that individuals who see others eating
healthfully and exercising will be more likely to do the same. On the note of framing, Thaler
and Sunstein suggest that “people are more likely to engage in self-examinations for skin and
breast cancer if they are told not about the reduced risk if they do so but about the increased
risk if they fail to do so.”25 As for their three pitches to the public sector, Thaler and Sunstein
suggest that the U.S. government should reevaluate whether choice-maximizing prescription
drug plans serve the best interests of their beneficiaries, investigate methods to increase
organ donation rates, and reframe climate change as a personal health hazard to encourage
individual action to reduce one’s carbon footprint.
Collectively, these insights are supported by decades of research into the budding
field of behavioral economics, and Thaler and Sunstein’s book represents one of the earliest
popular explanations of the field. As Biniyam Appelbaum remarks on the topic, “Great
scientists are often portrayed as singularly bad at communicating with other humans; indeed,
this is held to be a mark of their brilliance. Great economists, by contrast, tend to be the

Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 113.
Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 114.
25 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 157.
23
24

Wolfe 21
popularizers of their own ideas.”26 With Nudge, Thaler further positioned himself in this
camp of self-popularizing economists. Not only did his work detail an array of simple
applications of phenomena that psychologists and economists took years to discover, but they
accompanied these applications with a tidy philosophy of their own creation. Along the way,
Thaler and Sunstein dismantle the dual misconceptions that it’s possible for policymakers to
avoid influencing people’s choices in the first place and that paternalism always involves
coercion. As added cover, the damage potential of a poor choice architect is the freedom of
choice that nudges guarantee the subjects of that unsuccessful policymaker.
Moving forward, it is essential to distinguish between the types of nudges and the
specific mechanisms they use to address behavioral irrationalities. Even critics of nudge
should hesitate to assume that their criticisms apply to all nudges, and likewise, advocates of
nudge should pay close attention to the design and application of every nudge they
encounter. Many of the criticisms and risks about nudge that follow hinge on who is doing
the nudging, and whether they are using information or emotion to influence the behavior of
their subjects. By returning to this chapter to remember the array of biases and fallacies at the
heart of most nudges, individuals can decide for themselves how and when they want for
their local governments to address their own irrationalities.
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Chapter 2: The Skeptics vs. The Advocates
“Many disputes are really about facts, not values, even though people think they are about
values, not facts.” –Cass Sunstein, 2018 Interview with Behavioral Scientist
When it comes to evaluating the ethical implications of nudges, it is essential to avoid the
trap Sunstein describes of mistaking a factual dispute for a values-oriented one. There are
certainly cogent arguments for and against nudging as a practice or specific nudge units, but
a well-informed citizen or public official should be able to distinguish between arguments
about the empirical success of nudges, political arguments about which a direction a certain
nudge should steer, and ethical arguments about whether nudges are inherently manipulative
and unacceptably so. This chapter will take up both sides of the third argument, ultimately
suggesting that nudges’ manipulation should not disqualify them from a policy maker’s
toolkit so long as citizens are well-informed about their existence.
Nudges, while not a common topic of popular media, have received popular criticism on
occasion, as they did in two Slate pieces from 2011 and 2013 suggesting that libertarian
paternalism is more paternalistic, and less effective, than Thaler and Sunstein suggest.27
Written while Cass Sunstein was working with the Obama administration’s Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, the 2011 article “When Nudge Comes to Shove”
suggests that “libertarian paternalists are often wrong on the underlying social science” and
design nudges that do not create the optimal outcomes for individuals or society. 28 Political
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scientists like Suzanne Mettler and sociologists like Kieran Healy whose work demonstrates
that nudges tend to unethically obscure their motives and treat citizens as ‘consumers’
incapable of making unencumbered decisions. On the other hand, the article “Nudge No
More” includes the additional critique that nudges have become a policy panacea. By
assuming that any negative policy outcome can be mitigated by encouraging individuals to
think differently, Adam Burgess suggests we are “oversimplifying [and] misconstruing
structural problems as individual lifestyle choices, diverting resources to the wrong
programs, or failing to enact new legislation.”29 In one sense, critics may interpret nudges as
government overreach, interfering in the lives of citizens where it should not, and on the
other hand, critics interpret some nudges as weak solutions for policy problems that go much
deeper than individual behavioral irrationalities. The Slate reporters derided nudges for
resting allegedly false premise that technocrats understand what ordinary people want better
than themselves. This criticism aligns with the main argument many academics also make
against nudge theory and libertarian paternalism.
One such critic is Edward Glaeser, the Harvard professor and urbanist who authored a
2006 paper on the topic, “Paternalism and Psychology.”30In it, Glaeser argues that nudges are
more coercive and less transparent than citizens deserve. Having written this critique before
Nudge was published, Glaeser specifically refers to one of Thaler and Sunstein’s earlier
papers written with Christine Jolls for the Stanford Law Review in 1998, wherein the authors
suggest that “bounded rationality pushes toward a sort of anti-antipaternalism—a skepticism
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about antipaternalism, but not an affirmative defense of paternalism.” 31 Glaeser is not
convinced that individuals, who err and tend to make biased decisions, are any more capable
of electing leaders who are innocent of these flaws and will implement only the most
prudent of nudges. Moreover, while Glaeser acknowledges the dangers of full-blown
paternalism, as manifested in the case of sin taxes, he expresses concern that “soft
paternalism,” as he calls it, “often relies on stigmatizing behavior like smoking, drinking or
homosexuality, and that can lead (and has led) to dislike or hatred of individuals who
continue to engage in the disapproved activities.”32 Further, these subtle cues are easier for
policy makers to hide and therefore more difficult for the public to identify and criticize. In
Glaeser’s account, “is hard to limit soft paternalism because it is so difficult to determine
whether a politician or public statement violated linguistic boundaries.” 33 As such, soft
paternalism offers outsized potential for unchecked abuse of power in a way that even hard
paternalism does not.
Although these arguments do not take up the inevitability of policy makers influencing
choice architecture, several nudge critics assert that nudges undermine individual liberties.
Recent work has both challenged and built upon Glaeser’s core ideas. Adam Hill’s 2017
article “Why Nudges Coerce: Experimental Evidence on the Architecture of Regulation,”.
encompasses the concern that “invisible or secret regulatory tools violate the fundamentally
Kantian value that governments treat individuals with respect,” but Hill acknowledges the
counterpoint that invisible nudges can be useful to counteract initial biases to produce
“outcomes that approximate those achieved by a completely informed, rational decision-
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maker.” 34 After conducting experiments on real human subjects via the Amazon Mechanical
Turks platform, Hill finds evidence to support his theory that individuals place less blame on
regulators for failed nudges than they do for failed laws. Hill’s finding is particularly
applicable today given that more and more regulation has come to occur through nudges, and
if their outcomes are not attributable to the policies themselves then the traditional account of
electoral accountability is actively being threatened by their deployment. To properly hold
regulators and behavioral scientists accountable, then, requires greater awareness of their
existence and operation.
Moreover, specific types of nudges have received further criticism for violating
individual autonomy and failing to accurately predict individuals’ preferences. In a recently
published piece by Avranitis, Kalliris, and Kaminotis titled “Are defaults supportive of
autonomy? An examination of nudges under the lens of Self-Determination Theory,” the
authors suggest that nudges rooted in default-setting face insurmountable ethical concerns.35
Even as Sunstein insists that nudges are meant to increase the choosing capacity of citizens
on the receiving end of nudges, Avranitis et al. argue that the mild manipulation associated
with default-setting undermines autonomy. Referring to earlier scholarship (Bovens, 2009;
Nagatsu, 2015), Avranitis et al. suggest that not all nudges successfully support the ultimate
preferences of the subjects of that nudge. Particularly, when nudges profess to serve the
social good rather than the individual good, they should be evaluated as a political tool rather
than a benevolent welfare-increasing mechanism. When it comes to self-determination
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theory, specifically, Avranitis et al. explain that “in order for people to be able to go their
own way, there should be enough ‘ways’ to choose from, that is, enough options.” 36 Put
simply, nudges involving the setting of defaults disrupt the array of options available to
individuals.
Using social influence is one of the more controversial nudges, given the negative stigma
associated with peer pressuring individuals, but social influence nudges do not actually
threaten individuals’ freedom to make the choice they believe is optimal. When it comes to
nudges rooted in social influence and either positive peer affirmation or adversary social
stigmas, Bichierri and Dimant address the ethical consequences in their 2019 working paper,
“Nudging with Care: The Risks and Benefits of Social Information.” 37 Unlike defaults, where
individual inaction will leave that individual with a different outcome than before the
nudge’s existence, social information as a mechanism of nudging does not compel behavior
change or even initiate one without the positive action of the nudged individuals. However,
as Bichierri and Dimant explore from the lens of the University of Pennsylvania’s Behavioral
Ethics Lab and the Identity and Conflict lab, actively making individuals more aware of
societal perceptions of an activity can place undue pressure on those individuals to make a
decision they would not have otherwise desired. Moreover, for the individuals who choose to
sustain the behavior the nudge seeks to limit, these individuals are psychologically worse off
for having to bear emotions like guilt, shame, and embarrassment for maintaining an activity
is not societally embraced.
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In response to this array of related, if quite distinct, concerns, Cass Sunstein published a
book-length defense of Nudge in 2014 entitled The Ethics of Influence.38 In the book,
Sunstein lays out seven core principles that he utilizes to undermine criticisms levied against
his theory. Where Glaeser and others express concern that nudges will coerce without
acknowledging their influence, Sunstein insists that nudges ought to be transparently
presented to the individuals subject to nudges.39 Where critics bemoan the risks that nudges
pose to autonomy and self-government, Sunstein argues that nudges are inevitable, given the
frequency of situations in which elected officials and executives must select a default or
weigh policies that will clearly lay out different social incentives for compliance. Where
critics question whether policy makers are truly the most neutral, well-intentioned figures to
deploy these nudges, Sunstein stresses that scientific-minded academics such as himself are
at the helm of the behavioral science labs and consultancies that provide the research and
evidence behind many governments’ nudge policies.
Sunstein’s argument wavers between a genuine defense of nudges’ goodness and a
less idealistic, if equally fervent, assertion that advocating for nudges is better than the
opposite. Sunstein spends relatively little time addressing the idea that nudges are inadequate
to achieve a worthy policy impact. More likely than not, informing individuals about their
energy usage will not shift behavior as dramatically as an energy tax, but Sunstein’s goal
with behavioral interventions was to limit government interference to preserve individual
liberty. As chief administrator of OIRA, Sunstein sought to apply cost-benefit analyses to
every aspect of regulatory policy making. Nudges, generally reliant on messaging or default
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changes, rarely fail such analyses, as even small societal benefits are likely to outweigh the
miniscule programmatic costs.
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Chapter 3: The Nudge Unit: A Transition from Public to Private Sector Leadership
Nudge, which governments could practically interpret as a self-help book to aid them
in solving policy problems without overly prescriptive action, has had a remarkable impact
on policymaking in the US and the UK over the decade since its publication. There is no
reason why nudges would necessarily work better in these countries than in others, but the
fact that the first nudge units took shape in the US and the UK speaks volumes about how
influential academics have been in the development of nudge units across the western world.
In fact, the first book-length account of their history, David Halpern’s Inside the Nudge Unit:
How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference, credits Cass Sunstein himself with
introducing nudge to the U.S. government through the Social and Behavioral Sciences
Team.40 In the UK, as well. Richard Thaler was heavily involved in the early stages of the
UK’s Behavioral Insights Team, a team that only came about after an aide of Prime Minister
David Cameron learned of Sunstein’s work on a trip to the U.S. to scope out innovative
policy ideas. Nudge units held an attraction because of their efficiency, applicability to a
wide range of policy problems, and measurability of their outcomes. Although there is
substantial empirical evidence affirming the effect of nudges that the US and the UK
experimented with, part of what resonated with policy makers is how simplistic and
common-sensical most nudges were. Nudge theory gained popularity quickly, developing a
litany of mnemonic devices and acronyms that the leaders of one nudge unit could pass on as
advice to the leaders of another, and the political discourse around nudge units quickly
became more focused on these superficial objectives than the tangible results.
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From studying these two early examples of policy makers applying nudge theory to
government problems at a national scale, one can see how nudge has always been a political
philosophy introduced from on high, rather than from the grassroots. While there is nothing
inherently wrong or dangerous about policies whose earliest advocates were academic
experts and the federal executives who respect them, the risk of abuse becomes greater when
those advocates fail to use their authority to seek popular approval for their esoteric policies.
By understanding the organization of the first two nudge units, their political affiliations, and
the scope of their work, one can better evaluate the municipal nudge units that have
succeeded them. In both countries, it was the promise of a low-cost policy with an outsized
impact on welfare that persuaded government executives to advocate for behavioral
interventions in the policy arena. The municipal nudge units that now exist in the U.S. have
followed their lead, mimicking their methodology and many of their specific nudges.

Federally Sanctioned Nudging in the US
In the U.S., nudging was introduced from the executive branch and began to influence
federal policy making and regulation without ever being the subject of a bill in the House of
Senate. Barack Obama’s appointment of Cass Sunstein as the ‘regulatory tsar’ of his
administration in 2009 marked the first instance of an academic using his or her political
influence to implement nudges in the policy arena.41 Obama and Sunstein had known each
other earlier in their careers, when they both taught at the University of Chicago Law School,
which helped put Sunstein in a political role where he could put his academic theory into
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practice.42 Granted, Sunstein was a well-known legal expert and had academic interests
generally aligned with the regulatory role he entered into, Before delving into behavioral
economics and psychology, specifically, Sunstein was deeply interested in the value of a
statistical life and evidence that governing agencies, particularly courts, applied the metric
inconsistently to their decision-making processes.43 As the Chief of the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), Sunstein established dual priorities of creating the
behavioral science initiative within the US Office of Technology and Innovation and
contributing to an executive order affirming the President’s commitment to applying costbenefit analyses to potential policies.44
During his time at OIRA, situated within the Office of Management and Budget, Sunstein
sought to deploy cost-effective regulation based upon insights from the field of behavioral
economics. One of his early successes was modifying the food pyramid designed by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, which he accomplished by designing an ideally proportioned
plate rather than an “incomprehensible” pyramid. The food plate, accompanied by further
details at ChooseMyPlate.gov, is emblematic of Sunstein’s driving principle, “for
government regulations and advice to be effective, they had to be intuitively easy to
understand.”45 Across other realms of policymaking, Halpern credits OIRA with influencing
the Affordable Care Act, financial reform, climate change policy, and consumer protection
policy.46 Under Sunstein’s leadership, the office was staffed by statisticians, economists, and
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psychologists who approached policy making from a consistently academic, empirical
perspective.
Nudging Across the Pond
As for the Behavioral Insights Team, which launched in the UK after Sunstein began his
tenure but has since outlasted the behavioral economics arm of the U.S. federal government,
the promise was again to arm the executive with a low-cost, innovative policy tool.
According to David Halpern, the founder and chief executive of BIT, it was his advisors
Steve Hilton and Rohan Silva who brought the idea of nudge back to the UK after meeting
with Richard Thaler. Halpern detailed this interaction in his account and goes on to describe
the events that cemented the unit’s vision and mission. Halpern suggests that aides like Silva
helped gain traction for nudging in the UK by publishing opinion pieces discussing the
potential for the policy, in doing so “hit[ting] the spot between being slightly crazy—enough
to break through into commentator and public attention—but intriguing and plausible enough
to stand up to sceptical scrutiny.”47 In recounting early cabinet meeting where Halpern
discussed developing a national nudge unit in the UK, he recalls initial skepticism from
confused secretaries, who became quite interested when Halpern revealed the success of
BIT’s first behavioral trials.
Around this time, nudging continued to gain momentum in the UK, as it received
additional support from Sir Gus O’Donnell, an economist who held various roles in the civil
service and had served as Cabinet Secretary to Prime Ministers. O’Donnell, in conjunction
with then Labour Cabinet Office Minister Liam Byrne and the economist Paul Dolan from
the Imperial College London, supported the writing of a report with Halpern and his Institute
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detailing the connections between human behavior and public policy. The team delved into
both laboratory and real-world “mental shortcuts, ‘errors’ and influences” to try to capture
how humans really thought, and how the British government could use that understanding to
better tailor its policies to its citizens’ tendencies. In doing so, Halpern replaced an earlier
behavioral insights framework of SNAP (Salience, Norms, Affect (emotion) and Priming)
with MINDSPACE, to provide policy makers with a more comprehensive guide to
behavioral insights. This mnemonic sought to remind policymakers to consider the
messenger communicating the information, the response to incentives to avoid loss, the social
norms that influence individuals, the defaults that drive people to rely on pre-set options, the
salience effect of focusing on what is novel and relevant, the priming effect of subconscious
cues, the emotional affect that shapes people’s actions, the commitments that drive people to
uphold public promises, and the ways in which ego leads people to act in ways that make
them feel better about themselves.
These academic ideas aligned with key aspects of the political climate in Britain in the
2000s. Nudges saw early support from both David Cameron’s supporters aligned with the
Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats, the junior partner in the Coalition. 48 According to
Halpern, the latter group “liked the liberal aspects of libertarian paternalism,” and
appreciated the empirical roots of all nudge policies. 49 By July 2010, the support of these
forces had laid the groundwork for the Behavioral Insights Team to begin its work, with a
mere £0.5 million budget and a team of fewer than ten people. As for its relationship to the
rest of the UK’s government, the Behavioral Insights Team was situated as a “tiny sister
unit” to the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (PMSU), and the initial team was to consist of
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civil servants from the PMSU and staff from the Better Regulation Executive (BRE) office of
the business department.50 As an office within the government and staffed with government
employees, BIT would prove to have far more public involvement and government oversight
than subsequent nudge units, particularly municipal nudge units whose staff consists of thirdparty consultants. With Halpern in a leadership position as a public servant, BIT set about
defining its mission to “transform at least two major areas of policy, spread understanding of
behavioural approaches across Whitehall, [and] achieve at least a tenfold return on the cost of
the unit.”51 Those objectives were especially salient at the time because the team knew that
BIT would be shuttered after two years if it did not meet the three goals.
Beyond those general objectives, Halpern and the entire leadership team of BIT remained
very attuned to the fragility of political support for new policy initiatives. Given that every
member of the team was a civil servant under the employ of the government, an
underwhelming nudge could have proved to be the end of the entire unit and their careers as
public servant. When it came to developing more specific metrics for a nudge unit’s success,
Halpern helped devise yet another mnemonic—APPLES—which explains that nudge units
need administrative support, political support, people with a high degree of subject expertise,
location near the center of governing power, experimentation driving the nudges, and
scholarship to back up the design of each policy proposal. Interestingly, popular support is
not mentioned among these needs, nor is it heavily discussed throughout Inside the Nudge
Unit. While Halpern does not explicitly recommend that nudge units obscure their objectives
or initiatives from public view, he does not place any particular importance on educating the
public or seeking their feedback about how nudge units should function and where
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behavioral interventions can improve their lives. Halpern does warn public officials that a
total lack of transparency can lead individuals to believe “that behavioural approaches are too
close to the dark arts of propaganda and subconscious manipulation (a concern of the right).”
Likewise, he suggests that underperforming nudges will leave their operations vulnerable to
the criticism “that behavioural approaches are an excuse for not acting more decisively and
effectively (a concern of the left).” Ultimately, both of these warnings are couched as advice
to keep nudge units above political reproach, certainly not as a sweeping call to for inclusive
public forums on nudge units.
As for the constituent-facing aspect of BIT’s operation, Halpern relied on Nudge’s
philosophy of EAST—easy, attract, social, and timely—to design nudges that would be
widely successful. “Friction,” as Halpern says, “matters greatly, and often much more than
policymakers and citizens ever thought.” Ease inspires nudges that attempt to redesign an
array of choices to make the individually or socially optimal option the lowest-friction
alternative. The most common example here would be default-setting, but “ease” can also
refer to streamlining processes to eliminate unnecessary steps, such as digitizing procedures,
using automation to directly re-enroll participants, and creating autofill mechanisms for
forms. Within the context of the government, Halpern mentions efforts to simplify the
language used in official letters and communications that individuals receive from various
offices. BIT learned to minimize the words used in official communications, and to simplify
and de-clutter website pages where forms were listed. On the flip side, knowing that
individuals are likely to follow the path of least resistance allows policymakers to insert more
friction into a procedure to discourage people from pursuing that route. Cooling-off periods
are emblematic of this approach, as they require people to respect a required delay between
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requesting and receiving access to financial products like payday loans. As with the other
aspects of EAST, ease relies on clear and consistent communication. To make something
easy, individuals must know how the law or program works, and how they can take
advantage of it.
To make something attractive merely requires communication to further convince
individuals that the alternative policy makers want them to pursue is worthwhile. Nudges’
reliance on the attraction factor most resembles advertising and marketing strategies—they
can make boring tasks look fun, make difficult choices seem simple, make lengthy tasks
seem quick. So long as policy makers do not outwardly lie, the nudge mindset ought to
encourage them to make the individually or socially optimal choice an easier or more
attractive one to make. For Halpern, “attraction” involves both commanding people’s
attention and persuading them to make the optimal choice. Governments have relied on
propaganda to achieve all sorts of objectives over time, famously including army recruitment.
BIT applied these insights to the UK tax and revenue services in an experiment of sending
letters to encourage people to report unofficial income. The letters explicitly informed
citizens that the government can discern when individuals are not reporting taxable income,
and it included information on how to easily remedy the mistake. At an even more granular
level, BIT tweaked the design of letters themselves, invoking methods like attaching Post-It
note images to letters, changing the color of the envelope from white to brown, and
scribbling personalized messages on the outside of the envelopes. According to Halpern, the
new envelope raised the response and completion rate from 21.8 to 26.0 percent when tested
on 5,000 HMRC letters, and the comparison of costs and benefits led to a return on
investment of over 200:1. Amongst several other applications, one interesting attractiveness
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tool BIT investigated was rewarding citizens for compliance as opposed to punishing them
for non-compliance. In Sweden, for example, camera footage that captured cars driving
within the speed limit was used to enter those drivers into a lottery to receive a portion of the
fines gathered from speeding tickets. 52 The experiment aligned with a drop in average speeds
from 32 to 25 kmh.
On the ‘social’ front, BIT sought to operationalize academic findings on how social
influences inspire behavior. Consumer research reveals that social influences play a strong
role in shaping consumer preferences, particularly in areas where quality is harder to
measure, such as art and music. Social norms also have a well-researched negative potential,
as individuals can mimic dangerous behaviors to the same extent that they are inclined to
mimic optimal behaviors. On the positive side, BIT decided to inform Brits that nine out of
ten taxpayers paid on time, and the experiment yielded an increase of 1.5 percentage points
in payment rate. BIT also applied social incentives to reduce unemployment by informing
individuals seeking jobs about the popularity of job fairs amongst their peers. In the US,
social incentives have motivated anti-obesity advertising campaigns associating fruits and
vegetables with Sesame Street characters and anti-alcoholism campaigns centered around the
statistical infrequency of binge drinking amongst university students. 53
To ensure that nudges take into account timeliness, Halpern discusses the importance of
isolating the point at which individuals make decisions and affirm habits. Whether the
context is parenting, wherein the first months of a child’s life are most influential to their
later intelligence, or honesty on forms, wherein the signature line is better placed at the
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beginning of the form to ensure veracity, timing is a significant dimension when it comes to
successful nudges. Moreover, the decisions one makes in the present are often different from
the decisions an individual predicts they will make in the future, and if the optimal decision
is the one made with some distance from the moment of action, nudges can incorporate some
level of present commitment to a future action. Even by broaching the subject and
compelling people to think about how they will react to a situation in the future makes them
more likely to execute that course of action rather than the one they would submit to in the
moment. To incorporate all three elements of timelines, Halpern advises that “the
intervention is targeted before the behaviour has become entrenched; the intervention is
aligned to a moment when it is likely to be most salient or when the existing behaviour is
disrupted; and its design will help the person overcome their own time inconsistency—
helping them to do what their future self would have wished.”54 One innovative policy
application of time-centric insights is the conditional cash transfer, wherein optimal behavior
that is less likely to be followed through with is accompanied by the promise of cash at the
moment of follow-through.
BIT has applied these principles to contexts like home energy use by alerting households
to their energy use relative to that of their neighbors, setting a precedent for future nudge
units who would design behavioral interventions around peer pressure. BIT’s contributors
like Silva toyed with the idea of taking that nudge one step further with “glowing orbs on
people’s roofs that would signal levels of energy to their owners and others,” though BIT did
not ultimately implement this design.55 It’s one thing to inform individuals about their
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performance relative to their neighbors’, allowing individuals the option to change or
maintain their habits without the potential to be punished for their behavior. It is quite
another, and perhaps indicative of larger ethical concerns about using social pressure to
manipulate people, to violate citizens’ privacy to inform one’s community about their
behavior.
Even in light of these powerful findings, Halpern discusses many setbacks that prevented
his team from implementing their knowledge across the government. Oftentimes, outdated
and complicated technological infrastructure made editing forms and procedures
prohibitively expensive. On other occasions, the inefficient procedure had been written into
law and would require new legislation to change it. The political process also influenced the
scope of their work, since agency heads could refuse to cooperate with BIT if their personal
politics were at odds with the politics of the Cameron administration.

Behavioral Insights Consulting—A Public Death and Private Revival of Nudge
While Sunstein’s behavioral economics outfit only ever existed federal initiative
working exclusively on federal policy issues, BIT evolved in a different direction that would
forever change the shape of nudge units in America. In 2014, the organization morphed from
a government-funded office to a privatised social purpose organization, which is now jointly
owned by the UK Cabinet Office, the innovation-oriented foundation Nesta and BIT’s
employees.56 Interestingly, one of the motivations for the rebranding was to attract new
expert staff and encourage staff retention, since staff would not be bound by civil service pay
grades and able to earn bonuses. While this transition from government office to privately-
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run organization was unheard of at the time, this unorthodox development gave BIT the
funding and independence Halpern desired to rapidly expand BIT’s portfolio.57
In its current form as a private consultancy, BIT’s clients range from countries like
Guatemala to cities, such as Portland, Chattanooga, and Anchorage. 58 Reflecting their global
presence, BIT has offices in New York City, Toronto, Sydney, Singapore, and Wellington. In
pursuit of their stated mission, to “generate and apply behavioural insights to inform policy,
improve public services and deliver results for citizens and society,” BIT has helped run over
750 projects across over thirty countries. 59 At least 400 of these projects have included
randomized controlled trials, and BIT encourages public officials to apply their behavioral
science methods by conducting hundreds of trainings across the globe.
While BIT is the most well-known firm of its kind in the general field of behavioral
science consulting, it has a close competitor when it comes to the design and operation of
government nudge units. Ideas42, which has only ever functioned as an independent, nonprofit consultancy, works to achieve similar goals for governments and other non-profits.
Like BIT, ideas42 has clients across the world, but its New York City office manages the
nudge units maintained through partnerships with the City of Chicago and New York City.
Because America’s municipal nudge units and other behavioral intervention initiatives are
primarily run by these two independent organizations, today’s nudge units see far less
government involvement than the original behavioral science initiatives in the U.S. and the
UK. Nonetheless, these national nudge units set the precedent of involving behavioral
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scientists in the policy landscape, and today’s municipal nudge units share similar goals and
methods to their predecessors. Although nudge units themselves are still vulnerable to the
same political will that wiped out the USBSI, the existence of the behavioral consulting firms
ensures that the behavioral economists and other social scientists on their staff will not be
fired with the closure of any particular nudge unit. This improved structure undoubtedly
attracts veritable talent to BIT and ideas42 without sacrificing the government relationships
and rigorous behavioral science methods at the core of the earlier federal nude units.
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Chapter 4: Nudge Theory in the Municipal Policy Making Landscape
It is municipal governments’ proximity to the daily lives of their constituents and their
unique promotion of efficiency and evidence-based policymaking that make cities the most
fascinating and relevant landscape for analyzing nudges today. Three historical trends are of
particular significance: city populations’ exponential growth, the evolution of expectations
around the extent of city service provision, and several periods of economic growth followed
by downturns have particularly pinched cities and pushed leaders to prioritize efficiency.
Together, these trends laid the groundwork for nudges, whose main selling points are 1) that
they are low-cost policies with disproportionately large benefits, 2) that they can influence
the behavior of many citizens across political affiliations, and 3) that they have applications
to a wide range of policy areas. Because behavioral interventions are more of a policy tool
than a specific policy solution, public officials can recycle the same concepts over and over.
Given municipal government’s budget constraints and limited powers to create new methods
of revenue generation, nudges can be vital tools to help city leaders collect and save more
money. As citizens expect their cities to become more involved in the provision of welfare
and maintenance of city services, nudges are a rare tool to help ensure that citizens are
optimizing the resources allocated to them.
Although the modern American city has a population in the millions, governed by
thousands of civil servants and elected officials, this was not always the case. In the
nineteenth century, populations were smaller, and the burdens placed on city officials were
much lighter. At that time, cities did not yet own the responsibilities of running schools,
coordinating welfare, providing healthcare, or managing complicated public transit systems,
as they do today. Even a service as essential to the modern city as public safety took decades
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to formalize, and New York City, for example, did not create its first full-time police force
until 1845.60 In the nearly two hundred years since, city governments have developed at
vastly different rates and incorporated different city services. By 2012, 89,004 local
governments existed in the United States, though many of these governments are so small
and under-funded that they are unable to address their residents’ policy needs. 61 Although
municipal governments are structured very differently depending on the locality, with
differing distribution of power between cities and counties, these thousands of local
governments collectively manage dozens of services on behalf of residents.
Alongside the growth in human capital cities experienced in the 19th and 20th centuries
came growth in municipal revenues and spending, even though waves of minimalist
government and austerity resurged several times.62 In New York City, for instance, per capita
city expenditures increased from $6.53 in 1850 to $27.3 in 1900, and according to Stephen
Craig that growth came about “despite a national culture that preferred minimal government,
over the course of a century municipal responsibilities had vastly increased.” 63 As Craig
reported in City Journal in 1991, New York City government spent roughly $3,000 per capita
in 1986.64 Eras of economic growth and downturns have changed the way that city officials
think about raising and spending money, but they certainly have not stopped officials from
doing so at increasingly high levels. While cities have grown in size and spending, the stakes
for success or failure have risen, and inflection points marked by the era of machine politics,
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the progressive era of urban reform, and the cost-benefit revolution begun in the 1980s have
slowly laid the foundation for the birth and rapid rise of nudges in municipal governance.
With cities continuing to grow in population size and budget, it is difficult for city officials to
design programs that reach the right individuals, and equally difficult for individuals to
navigate bureaucratic processes to access the resources they need. Following the transition
from the machine era to the progressive area where equity replaced nepotism as a political
value, nudges clearly fit in with the recent trends of seeking cost-efficiency and optimizing
resources.

Era of Machine Politics through the Progressive Era
Amongst historical periods of city development most helpful in explaining the rise of
nudges in cities like New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, the age of machine politics from
the late 1800s to the mid 1900s stands out. Roughly a century after the nations’ founding, the
speed of city development had begun to pick up, and mob-style groups of political leaders
gained the moniker of machine bosses as they aggregated political capital to assert control
over the distribution of the city’s resources. To convey the extent of machines politics,
political scientists Dennis Judd and Annika Hinze note that "between 1870 and 1945, 17 of
the nation’s 30 cities with populations more than half a million people were governed
through boss rule and a disciplined, hierarchical party organization at some point.” 65 Despite
the many ways that machine politics bred inequality and set precedents for corruption and
favoritism in city politics, one arguably positive relic of the era was the separation between
ideology and city administration. Even at a time when competitions for wealth and power pit
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machines against one another, Judd and Hinze remark, “the operating principles and
structures of the urban machines encouraged the politicians who ran them to steer clear of
ideological battles.”66 Before the end of the 20th century, political bosses’ nepotistic and
corrupt behavior had driven reformers to prioritize talent and fairness amongst city leaders.
In opposition to machine-era favoritism, the reform era that followed set the tone for
preferencing neutral, evidence-based policymaking in cities. Although some accounts of the
machine era assert that boss rule peaked in the 1920s and did not fully come to an end until
the death of Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley in 1976. Despite the influence of the machines,
as early as the 1890s reformers succeeded in pushing cities to adopt measures to reduce
election fraud like voter registration and literacy requirements, Australian ballot, and
nonpartisan election methods, along with codified civil service hiring systems.67 During the
movement for municipal reform, “‘efficiency and economy’ became code words for good
government.”68 In this environment newly absent of corruption and narrowly-distributed
excess, most constituents came to appreciate the progressive efforts to reign in nepotism and
graft. By the late 1890s, the advocates of municipal reform had managed to develop a new
theory of government centered around commitments to 1) maintaining strict budgetary
controls to keep taxes low and delivering public services cost-effective, 2) establishing a
deliberate separation between the day-to-day administration of city government and city
politics 3) hiring public servants who possess the training and expertise to conduct city
services; and 4) running governments like a business. Emphasizing the latter objective, cost

Judd and Hinze, City Politics, 64.
Judd and Hinze, City Politics, 66.
68 Judd and Hinze, City Politics, 69-70.
66
67

Wolfe 46
efficiency became “the ultimate touchstone for good government,” and citizens lauded city
leaders who were associated with modest spending and few debts.69
Such principles of responsibility and austerity aligned with the new goals of Progressiveera politicians to be “more moral, more rational, and more efficient and, because it was so,
self-evidently more desirable.”70 Reformers, who tended “to have come especially from the
more advanced segments of their professions, from those who sought to apply their
specialized knowledge to a wider range of public affairs” injected an appreciation for
technocracy into municipal governments that would last for many decades, only to be
challenged most aggressively by citizen discontent in the wake of economic downturns
throughout the 20th and early 21st century.71 The popular view on technocracy has shifted
somewhat since then, particularly in recent years where some Americans have come to
distrust experts associated with the ‘establishment.’ Even so, the lasting impact of the
transition to expert-led public officials laid the foundation for introducing the behavioral
economists, statisticians, and data scientists associated with nudge units into city
government.

Building Upon the Business Model72
Alongside the governing principles that emerged in the reform era following the fall of
political machines, academics provided their own support for efficient government. In the
case of Frederick Winslow Taylor, who published The Principles of Scientific Management
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in 1911, his fierce advocacy for the application of military discipline and hierarchy came to
influence city governance. Similarly, Henry Brueré, the first director of the New York
Bureau of Municipal Research, preached principles of efficient design in city management. 73
In accordance with these principles, scientific experts and business leaders advocated for
municipal offices focused on spending and oversight and encouraged city leaders to staff
those offices with experts.
As the municipal emphasis on efficiency intensified and the business model of cities
progressed through its early stages of experimentation, cities began to diverge in their
administrative structure, with some being led by strong mayors and other by strong city
councils. With this shift, however, municipal politics became more political, as it became
clear that city leaders would yield power over growing budgets and more extensive
responsibilities than less formal machines had controlled. As Judd and Hinze explain,
“despite the references to the business model, it was hard to hide the fact that the city
manager plan was political in both intent and effect,” especially given the fact that the plan
was intended “to ensure the election of a different class of people who would insulate
government from the influence of the Great Unwashed.” 74 At times, the business-inspired
governance model has referred merely to prioritizing profits and minimizing wasteful
spending, and others it referred to the professional background of the civic leaders and
administrators. In times of fiscal crisis, especially, individuals pay particular attention to the
political affiliation of their city leaders and the partisan implications of certain spending
priorities.75 In general, city leaders found that associating themselves with efficiency and
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business model leadership was a wise political move, giving them cover to justify their
policy initiatives with social science and promise their constituents that they were saving
money and spending wisely.

The Great Depression, the Great Society, and EDCs
The financial situations of many large cities reflected the same fate of the nation between
1923 and 1927, with “spending by the largest 145 cities [rising] 79 percent,” and “the 13
biggest cities [incurring’ 50 percent more debt in the 1920s.”76 During the Great Depression
that followed, urban development was shaped by “1) a fiscal and social crisis in the cities, 2)
indifference by the states, and 3) the forging of an alliance among city officials for the
purpose of securing a federal response to their problems.”77 In response to the crisis,
municipal leaders helped to found the United States Conference of Mayors (USCM) in 1933
to create a venue where mayors of large cities could lobby the federal government for
consideration of their cities’ interests in New Deal policies.78 Encouraging policies that
touched upon housing, unemployment, and urban infrastructure, the New Deal’s
incorporation of urban interests suggested that, according to Flanagan “the strength of the
USCM also marked a distinctive period in American federalism in that direct and substantial
federal-urban links ended the hierarchical relationship among levels of government in which
the federal government interacted with the states, and the states with cities, that had prevailed
until the 1930s.”79
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One final key development leading up to nudge units was the birth of community and
economic development corporations during the Great Society Era beginning in the 1960s. 80
Economic development corporations tend to be “nonprofit corporation[s] that [use] city
resources — everything from city-owned buildings to special funding sources such as cityissued bonds — to promote economic growth and create a bridge between city agencies,
private businesses, and the needs of the community.”81 As city leaders learned during some
of the most socially turbulent times of the latter half of the twentieth century witnessed,
“within urban areas, extreme inequality has always been expressed in two ways: social
disorder (in the form of crime, riots, and family disorganization, for instance) and residential
patterns of segregation.”82 In response to the pervasiveness of inequality and resulting social
tensions, civic leaders experimented with a variety of welfare programs. Into the 1970s and
80s, federal efforts sought to leverage private investments in troubled cities and
neighborhoods, inviting a growing number of experiments with public-private partnerships. 83
Efforts surrounding revitalization, urban renewal, and reinvestment intensified as cities
were told to improve their ability to compete, as “state and local governments will find it is in
their interests to concentrate on increasing their attractiveness to potential investors,
residents, and visitors.” It was amidst these revitalization efforts that the modern economic
development corporations sprung up in cities around the country. While nudge units have no
direct predecessor from which they evolved, the economic development corporation is
arguably an influential forebearer, since economic development corporations are often
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public-private partnerships who use public funds to optimize city resources and encourage a
behavior change. Economic development corporations have more a geographical focus,
targeting particular neighborhoods for investment and business growth, but like nudge units,
they fit into the trend of cost-efficient, expert-driven municipal governance.
Moreover, public-private economic development corporations are a feature that New
York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia had in common before each city saw the launch of its
nudge unit. While public-private partnerships are not necessarily rare in municipal
governments, economic development corporations are large and powerful examples of
private-sector leadership influencing the policy decisions of civic leaders, and familiarity
with this dynamic likely shepherded the adoption of nudge units. In New York City, the
precursor to the economic development corporation that exists today was the New York City
Public Development Corporation, launched in the 1960s to sell or lease city-owned property
in order to help create jobs. Later on, the city created the Economic Capital Corporation to
help finance businesses and development with money through selling bonds, and in 1991 the
city governments merged these two programs into the Economic Development Corporation
that still exists today.
Similarly, Philadelphia’s government has granted great trust and authority to its economic
development corporation, started in 1958 as a non-profit joint venture between the City of
Philadelphia and the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce. At the time, there were no
public-private partnerships, and Philadelphia’s privately led office was a total experiment to
spur job creation and adapt to changes in manufacturing trends. 84 According to PIDC
President John Grady, “[t]he experience in the city was public sector doing urban renewal,
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private sector leading developments like Penn Center,” and in his view, “The whole idea of
creating a private organization that has shared governance between the public sector and
private sector was in itself innovative. It was very progressive at the time.”85 Given the
success that Philadelphia’s economic development corporation achieved by helping the city
attract capital and coordinate private infrastructure project, the city’s experiment set a
positive preference for public-private partnerships and inviting business leaders and
academics to advise the Philadelphia government. Nudge units, while often oriented toward
optimizing existing city resources rather than generating new ones, fit into a very similar
trend or philosophy of municipal policy making.86

The Cost-Benefit Revolution
While many of the aforementioned policy shifts and political battles took place within
cities, the evolution of the federal dynamic between national and local governments also
influenced how nudges first got incorporated into municipal policy. The Reagan
administration marked a watershed moment for efficiency-driven policymaking with the
passage of Executive Order 12291. 87 The order, which Reagan passed in 1981, severely
constrained regulatory authority with the requirement that the benefits of any regulation
outweigh the costs, and it set up several parameters that would be used to guide executive
agencies’ in their evaluation of a policy or program’s worthiness. It mixed a long-held
appreciation for efficiency with the economic pressures exerted by a presidential
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administration who cut back significant federal funds that had been allocated toward cities. In
doing so, it left city leaders in a position ripe to adopt innovative cost-saving policies.
Amidst the cost-benefit revolution, city officials’ relative insulation from public scrutiny
and their tendency to pursue ideologically neutral policies to a greater extent than state and
federal politicians further help to explain why city leaders and administrators have been some
of the earliest and most committed advocates of nudges. Municipalities manage enormous
budgets and services as wide-ranging essential to their citizens’ daily lives as trash collection,
education, and zoning. Cable news and popular print media commonly cover every
presidential campaign and the daily activity, or inactivity, of Congress, but they have
historically paid far less attention to the elections and political administrations at the
municipal level. While stories of corruption, bankruptcies, and public health crises certainly
make their way into the mainstream media, local officials, particularly non-elected
bureaucrats, can more room experiment. These officials also perhaps have confidence that
the outcomes of their policies will be noticed far more than the innerworkings of their
administration. Thus, as cities have grown and city officials’ responsibilities have ballooned,
officials have had the latitude to experiment with policies that may have drawn greater
skepticism if presented on the national level.
From the rejection of political machines to the embracing of the cost-benefit revolution,
historical trends in adopting cost-saving, expert-driven policies laid the political groundwork
for municipal nudge units. Without social scientists welcome in the governance sphere, or
without cities’ open-minded approach toward public private partnerships, nudge units simply
would not exist. From looking at the staff and structure of nudge units in Chapter 6, it will
become clear that knowledge of behavioral economics and experience with social science
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methods are essential to operating a nudge unit, and one should not take for granted that
individuals with those backgrounds are welcome in city government. Two hundred years ago,
they would not have been, but in the time since cities have become more familiar with and
accepting of policy guidance from non-politicians. They have also been exposed to publicprivate partnerships models, whose success with incorporating non-civil servants into the
operation of municipal governments offered city leaders a precedent for the model that most
behavioral design consultancies propose for municipal nudge units.
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Chapter 5: Unpacking the Structure and Strategy of the Municipal Behavioral Design Team

Having situated nudge units amidst larger trend of cost-efficient, apolitical municipal
policymaking, it is worth examining what work nudge units have actually engaged in and how
cities and their partners have tracked their work and measured their success. To understand the
scope of nudges in cities, it helps to look to the origins and early work of the behavioral design
teams in New York City, Philadelphia, and Chicago. What stands out in reviewing nudge units’
first several years of activities is the subtlety of the nudges, the breadth of policy areas to which
they are applied, the consistency of experimental methodology, and the failure of nudge units
and their city sponsors to seek progress reviews or audits from outside sources. The main
constraint in evaluating nudge units’ work comes from this failure, since annual reports from
ideas42 and the Behavioral Insights Team are the primary sources for studying nudge units’
projects and successes. Despite this limitation, it is still possible to understand the nudge units’
approach to behavioral interventions, their variety of projects, the backgrounds of the individuals
behind them, and the sources of funding and oversight. Understanding these dimensions is
essential to eventually evaluate nudge units, since it illustrates the limited resources and unique
incentives that are at play.
Ideas42—Philosophy and Structure of BDT Partnerships

New York City and Chicago’s behavioral design teams exemplify the consultantdependent model, which stands out as the simplest method for setting up a nudge unit. Their
guiding philosophy and office structure demonstrate just how influential ideas42 has been in
setting the agenda and carrying forth the work of behavioral interventions. In these cities, no
single public official is in charge of the team and most of the substantive work of the nudge unit
is carried out by ideas42 staff. Although the New York BDT is billed as a partnership with the
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mayor’s office, the leaders and staff of the team are direct employees of ideas42. Several
members of the Ideas42/NYC-BDT team--including Anthony Barrows, Natalie Dabney, Jon
Hayes, and Rachel Rosenberg—also contributed to a larger report that teaches city officials how
to implement ideas42’s approach for their own nudge units.88 This report is the main source of
information about the principles and methods ideas42 deploys in its policy-oriented nudges, and
the report sheds light on the variety of behavioral interventions tested in New York City and
Chicago. Finally, the report affirms that ideas42 employees are the most involved in shaping the
philosophy of the nudge unit, and in the process of designing and testing the interventions.
The general takeaways from the report center on ideas42’s philosophy of applied
behavioral insights. In the government context, where “the success of policies, programs, and
services depends on people’s decisions and actions,” understanding behavioral tendencies and
being able to predict how individuals will choose to interact with (or ignore) a government
initiative is particular salient. 89 To communicate the difference between traditional approaches to
policy making and behavioral approaches, the authors suggest two different interpretations of the
answers to what drives human behavior, how to motivate behavior change, and what inaction
tells us about people and their preferences. In their view, traditionalists adhere to beliefs that
“personal preferences and values are usually stable” and predictive of behavior, while “raising
awareness and providing new information or incentives” is capable of driving behavior change. 90
While providing awareness, full information, and direct incentives can shape individuals’
“intentions,” this approach acknowledges that it may be necessary to remove barriers and
increase the ease of an activity to inspire a behavior change. When it comes to investigating why
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a behavior occurs, behavioral scientists at ideas42 focus their approach on asking how aspects of
an individual’s environment are actively shaping their choices and actions in the policy context.
Apart from ideas42’s philosophy of behavioral intervention, which they transmit to their
municipal nudge partners, the organization shares its research methodology with the local nudge
units that it operates. According to the researchers and practitioners behind NYC’s BDT, the
approach to their projects encompasses A/B testing for RCTs, field observations, usability test,
data analysis, and interviews of New York City residents. Generally, ideas42 emphasizes the role
of impact evaluation in behavioral design, and it attests to using several evaluative tools to
“determine with reasonable certainty whether an intervention achieves its desired effect.” 91
However, this commitment is more nominal than it is substantial, given that ideas42 is the only
known evaluator of its own work, and its evaluations are compromised by its own incentive to
deem its projects successful. When projects do not have their desired effects, ideas42 deigns the
data collection process a success in that negative or null results help diagnose ineffective
interventions. As for finding what works, well-tested innovation and a fair amount of risk are
necessary for success, demanding a certain degree of political capital that leaves room for
failures in the overall BDT portfolio. To meet rigorous standards of data collection without
drawing out project timelines to years, ideas42 tends to choose projects where outcome data is
actively being collected. In line with this rigor, ideas42 reports that BDT initiatives generally
allow for random assignment of people to different treatment groups and work with a large
enough sample that small outcome differences are still statistically significant.
With this philosophy and methodology passed on from ideas42 to the behavioral design
teams in New York City and Chicago, the third main area of influence ideas42 has over these
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nudge units is in their organizational structure. Although behavioral interventions could be
delegated to a Chief Behavioral Officer or fully decentralized by having individual agencies
contract with behavioral advisors directly, ideas42 (unsurprisingly) advocates for a semidecentralized approach of an embedded Behavioral Design Team. With a suggested model of a
cross-agency group of behavioral designers and policymakers, ideas42 pushes cities to aspire to
BDTs that “stay nimble enough to keep a finger on the pulse of multiple agencies and to take on
projects as needs emerge.”92 According to ideas42, a successful BDT should be able to both
achieve impact at scale and promote a cultural shift in the city’s political landscape toward
behavioral and evidence-based policymaking. To achieve this goal, ideas42 prioritizes
determining project selection criteria from the outset, focused on five areas: city priority and
social impact, agency buy-in and capacity, clear touchpoints for introducing behavioral
interventions, existing data collection mechanisms, and randomization and large sample sizes for
evaluative purposes.
With these criteria in place, ideas42 adheres to a standard and robust design process for
its BDTs and their nudge pilots. Across all BDTs, this process involves at least five elements of
defining problems, diagnosing actionable behavioral bottlenecks, designing scalable
interventions, testing pilots, and ultimately scaling proven solutions to larger populations or
adapting them to other contexts.93 Rather than a linear progression of steps, ideas42 refers to
their design process as “circuitous in practice,” involving frequent returns to earlier stages when
reviewing results of certain intervention trials or when new information becomes available.
Because the problem may not have the correct initial diagnoses—after all, negative policy
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outcomes cold be driven by one or multiple problems of uptake, follow-through, retention,
compliance, or performance—behavioral design can involve many returns to the early stages
until the irrational behavior mechanism is fully understood. To this end, BDTs partnered with
ideas42 engage in “behavioral mapping,” a propriety technique intended to “pinpoint discrete
decision and action points in a process” by identifying “psychological factors and contextual
features that might affect choice and action.” 94 Overall, applying this consistent and
straightforward methodology assures city partners that ideas42 is committed to maintaining a
simple and verifiable process that cities could later review. Unfortunately, no city partner or
outside agency has ever conducted a review to assess how consistent ideas42 actually is.
Structurally, the NYC Behavioral Design Team was designed as a partnership with NYC
Mayor’s Office to assist city agencies with behavioral design, and this partnership has involved
the work of over thirty city agencies. Although ideas42 shoulders much of the responsibility for
operating the nudge unit, its partnership illustrates how many members of the city government
are supporters of the nudge unit and how much the unit relies on outside financing. 95 Financially,
the BDT received significant support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation,
which awarded Ideas42 $1.2 million dollars between 2014 and 2016. These grants, distributed as
$375,000 in 2014, $450,000 in 2015, and $375,000 in 2016, were designated as awards to
support “Community & Economic Development,” “Digital Media & Learning,” and “What
We’re Exploring: Cities, Information, and Governance,” respectively. 96 In mid-2018,
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announcements from the New York City Office of the Mayor acknowledged a new philanthropic
partner, the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, which would help support the BDT through the
end of 2019.97 According to the foundation’s own reporting, their Arnold Ventures arm allocated
$399,993 to ideas42 in 2013, and a second grant of $489,230 in 2018 with the stated purpose “to
design, implement, and test a set of behavioral interventions in emergency departments to
improve outcomes for patients with opioid use disorder.” 98 Several million dollars may seem like
a small budget compared to other city initiatives, but it is a large amount of money to allocate to
a government office that has very little city oversight or independent verification of its success.
As a public private partnership, ideas42 does not experience the same burden of internal reviews
as other agencies, and its reliance on philanthropic funds helps to explain why its nudge units are
not as reliant on the city for constant approval of proposed behavioral interventions.
In Chicago, the behavioral design team has many similarities in the structure of the
operation and its approach to integrating behavioral insights into municipal policy. Instead of the
Arnold Foundation, the largest philanthropic backer of the Chicago BDT was the John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, which supported its first two years of functioning, until the
City of Chicago took over funding. The BDT’s partners in city government include Chicago’s
Chief Sustainability Officer & Senior Policy Advisor, the Chief Policy Officer of the Mayor’s
Office, and the former Director of Chicago’s Innovation Delivery Team.
While the achievements of New York City and Chicago’s behavioral design team
impressed local officials, there is no denying that the coverage of these achievements is colored
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by the fact that ideas42 is the primary source of reporting. Even so, ideas42 does seem to be
forthcoming about the resources and commitment necessary to replicate its work in new cities.
To create a behavioral design team in a new context, city governments eager to adopt behavioral
insights, philanthropies willing to provide seed funding to the BDTs, and the third-party
consultancy like ideas42 (or BIT) capable of setting the BDT’s agenda and providing the
expertise in behavioral design and project implementation and evaluation. Within cities, there is
also the matter of buy-in from the agencies who tend to be the intermediaries between BDTs and
city employees or residents. There is a fourth key element, however, which is only briefly
mentioned in the report—the side-partnerships that ideas42 has come to facilitate between
municipal BDTs and academic experts like Stanford’s Omid Fotuhi, who collaborated on a
CUNY initiative, or UVA’s Ben Castleman, who advised one of ideas42’s projects to encourage
college matriculation among accepted students. Behavioral design is a broad field tasked with
addressing very specific challenges, and the staff of any given consultancy may not have the
needed expertise, or connections to experts, to help cities address their behavioral challenges.
Many university programs do exist, but the geographic concentration of these institutes further
suggests that cities across America may struggle to gain equal access to the academic expertise
that the Chicago and NYC BDTs have come to rely on.99

Scope of Initiatives
While understanding the historical underpinnings and organizational structure of
behavioral design teams helps individuals understand how nudge units serve the goals of
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municipal governments, any future evaluation of nudge units would center on the scope and
strategy of the nudge initiatives. Because nudges are so widely applicable, and each nudge unit
prioritizes different initiatives, evaluating a nudge unit requires a deep familiarity with their
trials. With a focus on user design, the BDT experimented with different improvements to city
processes and forms involving accessing public benefits, obtaining flu shots, distributing court
appearance tickets, and paying parking tickets before their due dates. In an attempt to increase
timely form submission for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) recertification
clients, the BDT worked with NYC’s Human Resources Administration to decrease failure to
submit forms by 5.5% and measurably increased timely form submission by 12.9% over a period
of less than forty-five days.100 Although several projects either had no effect on the sample or
had results pending at the time of the report’s publication, other initiatives in the realm of
economic mobility included increasing timely interview completion for SNAP recertification
climates, increasing the uptake of the Neighborhood Homelessness Prevention Outreach
program, and increasing usage of the online tax prep portal through the Department of Consumer
Affairs—Office of Financial Empowerment.
In the realm of education, the majority of initiatives revolved around a partnership
between the New York City BDT and the City University of New York system. This consistent
partnership is unique among nudge units, and it sets an auspicious precedent for other city
agencies to engage in longer term relationships with their local nudge unit. Project objectives
included increasing financial aid renewal among freshman at community colleges, improving
placement testing outcomes among the same group, and boosting retention rates of community
college students of all ages and years. Other BDT-CUNY nudges included RCTs to help
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community college students enroll in 15 or 30 credits per semester to establish stronger
momentum, help them maintain a GPA high enough to remain eligible for state financial aid
(TAP), and promote matriculation among students admitted to college, generally referred to as
summer melt. In Chicago, the BDT established side partnerships with Chicago Public School and
the Department of Family and Support Services to implement design-based nudged and RCTs to
increase early Pre-K enrollment, early Pre-K attendance, and minimize Summer Melt.
While there seems to be a lack of cohesion or a common theme amongst the initiatives
categorized as “equity and justice”-oriented nudges, they each utilize messaging to inspire the
desired behavior change. Amongst initiatives that ideas42 classified as equity and justiceoriented were two partnerships with the New York Fire Department to increase test filing rates
for firefighter candidates, which increased overall filing rates by 36.7%, with an 84% increase
among black candidates, and an 83% increase among female candidates. In New York City,
another nudge from the Small Business Services agency to increase recertification rates for small
businesses owned by women and under-represented minorities was scaled citywide. In Chicago,
the BDT worked with the Department of Family and Support Services to increase the “feeling of
safety over 4th of July among youth in summer jobs programs,” to “increas[e] youths’
accomplishment of goals set at the beginning of summer,” and to “increase[e] feeling of safety
among youth between end of summer jobs program and school resuming.” 101 By relying on
messaging rather than increased policing or other physical safety measures, this nudge
epitomizes the low-cost style of behavioral interventions that nudge units tout.
Meanwhile, Government Operations projects included side partnerships with the greatest
number of agencies, including the NYC and Chicago Departments of Finance, the Chicago
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Department of Human Resources, the Chicago Police Department, the Chicago Department of
Business Affairs and Consumer Protection, and the NYC-311 program. Project successes include
text message reminders on court appearance rates. The messages highlighting penalties reduced
non-appearance by 21%.102 Behavioral consultations to the NYC 311 app reduced misfiled
service requests from 59% to 9%. In Chicago, RCTs yielded positive outcomes of a 31%
increase in on-time payments of parking tickets (a 4 percentage-point increase), a 27% increase
in payment rates of police citations, and a 4% reduction in average time to renew business
licenses. As for design initiatives in government operations that were ultimate scaled citywide,
Chicago worked to increase retention of Police Department recruits at the stage of physical
evaluation called the POWER Test, and New York City helped homeowners understand and act
on property valuation notices, and assisted property owners in avoiding the sale of tax liens
incurred from nonpayment. Three further applications where results are still pending or sample
effects have not yet been discerned were a nudge to increase city citation payments in Chicago, a
nudge to increase electronic tax filing and payment in New York City, and a nudge to increase
parking ticket payment rate in the pre-judgment phase.
Health projects, of which there were fewer, involved partnerships with New York City’s
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, the Office of Labor Relations—WorkWellNYC, and
the Department of Public Health in Chicago. Of the six projects, ideas42 observed positive
results in New York City’s initiative to boost flu vaccine uptake among city employees (the
nudge increased vaccine uptake by 5% in the pilot and by 10% at scale), and a Chicago initiative
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to increase the uptake of in-home lead paint inspections, where response rates increased from
0.4% to 1.2%. The nudge toward flu vaccines, in particular, is highlighted in the report as an
exemplar of cross-agency collaboration and utilizing specialized academic knowledge of
behavioral science to implement several potential intervention designs. The most successful
intervention, a behaviorally informed email, was then sent to the entire City workforce during the
2017-2018 flu season to achieve maximum impact. Other health projects designed to increase the
submission of forms authorizing in-school treatment of students with asthma, assist school
personnel acquire and act on authorization to treat students with asthma, and promote the
adoption of online and telephonic medical services via insurance card inserts did not have
reported outcomes data available but were scaled citywide. A sixth project in New York City
sought to encourage the adoption and active use of blood pressure monitors in pharmacies.
Without necessarily investing in making healthcare more accessible or affordable, the nudge unit
promoted better health outcomes citywide by encouraging New Yorkers and Chicagoans to make
use of existing healthcare resources.
In the final category of sustainability initiatives, Chicago’s BDT had tested six pilots and
RCTs in conjunction with the city’s Sustainability Team. The most successful outcomes came
from projects designed to increase energy benchmarking compliance (it did so by 6.2% in the
RCT), reduce commuter congestion on public transit (it reduced peak-hour ridership on the Red
Line on game days by 15.4% as a pilot), and reduce disposable bag use via a city tax (it was
associated with a reduction of over 40% in difference-in-difference evaluation). Beyond these
examples, the partnership also resulted in a project to increase energy efficiency investments
among building owners by sending them informative energy benchmarking letters. In New York
City, the main sustainability-oriented nudge increased flood insurance survey responses by 15.5
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times (or 4.52 percentage points) in a trial conducted with the Office of Recovery and Resilience.
Sustainability-oriented behavioral interventions should be of particular interest to municipal
nudge units, since most policies designed to improve sustainability are either quite costly or quite
intrusive. Rather than taxing individuals more heavily for their energy usage or forcing stores to
offer discounts for reusable bags, nudges can remind individuals when there is a more
sustainable alternative and make that alternative look most appealing.
Overall, the ideas42 model deployed in New York City and Chicago demonstrates the
breadth of applicability of behavioral interventions, and the results ideas42 have published are
promising. Ideas42 has demonstrated the viability of a consultant-dependent model, where no
one directly employed by the city needs to possess behavioral economics knowledge or expertise
in running randomized control trials. The benefits of this model, at least as manifested in the
partnerships with New York City and Chicago, are that the administration of the nudge unit is
handled by contractors. The ideas42 staff members, primarily at the associate level, manage all
of the internal relationships between the nudge unit and the agency partners, and their credibility
as outside experts helps them persuade new agencies to begin working with the BDT. However,
relying on outsiders leaves a questionable trail of accountability for the potential failures of a
nudge unit. Despite the impressive array of projects in their current portfolio, a nudge unit
affiliated with ideas42 or reliant on another consultancy would not leave its constituents in a
powerful position to question behavioral interventions they do not like.

Philadelphia: The Lone Independent Behavioral Design Team
As for one of the few identifiable examples of a municipal nudge unit sustained without
ideas42 or BIT, Philadelphia’s Behavioral Science Initiative was launched by its own team of
academic experts and professional staff. What originated with Philadelphia’s selection as a City
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Accelerator initiative participant, spawned by Living Cities and the Citi Foundation, eventually
crossed over into the subsequent mayor’s administration and became a formalized nudge unit
and hub of behavioral science research in mid-2016.103 At its founding, PBSI had fewer than 10
team members and a narrow mission to more efficiently enroll Philadelphia residents in utility
and taxpayer assistance programs.
More so than other municipal nudge units discussed PBSI has greater involvement from
both government and academia, which make Philadelphia’s nudge unit more accountable to
citizens and make its results more meaningful when published in an academic journal. Between
local government and academia, PBSI’s partners include the City of Philadelphia, the Fels Policy
Research Initiative of the University of Pennsylvania, and the Lang Center for Civic & Social
Responsibility. From the City, it is the Mayor’s Policy Office that works with PBSI to integrate
evidence-based practices across city government, and in pursuit of this strategic initiative the
Mayor launched GovLabPHL in 2017. At least under the current mayor, it is his Director of
Policy Anjali Chainani who leads GovLabPHL and manages the collaboration between PBSI and
the City of Philadelphia. Amongst the academics affiliated with PBSI is Swarthmore College
Assistant Professor Syon P. Bhanot and UPenn Professor Daniel Hopkins, both of whom helped
co-found the initiative.104
A 2018 Results for America study explores PBSI’s citywide evaluation model, which
stands out for its academic rigor when compared to BIT and ideas42.105 The case study describes
several PBSI projects, with target populations ranging from the elderly, to delinquent taxpayers,
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to all Philadelphia residents. Through a partnership with the Department of Revenue & Senior
Citizen Water Bill Discount Program, PBSI tested methods of messaging to ultimately achieve a
9% increase in enrollment approvals to the program. With the Department of Revenue and
Delinquent Tax Payments, PBSI helped the city collect $615,752 in overdue real estate tax
payments (with a mere $17,000 invested in the pilot).106 Across the city, PBSI tested various
new-user discounts for the Philly Bike Share system through the Office of Transportation and
Infrastructure, which were associated with statistically significant increases in returning riders.
Additionally, PBSI worked with the Mayor’s Taskforce on Litter Reduction and Zero Waste to
identify challenges such as waste bin availability in public places. One of PBSI’s last early trials
was a series of interventions with different messages sent from the Department of Licenses and
Inspections & Online Licensing to increase the use of online license registration.
PBSI also engaged in several behavioral analyses of several larger issues, though the case
study was published before the conclusions of the reports were available. The questions
investigated in these reports revolved around methods Philadelphia could test to increase the
uptake rate of EITC-eligible residents applying for the tax credit, boost the number of city
employees and spouses who participate in the City Wellness Program, make youth summer jobs
more accessible and equitable to young Philadelphians, and encourage low-income residents to
continue using the Philly Bike Share program during the winter.
PBSI’s academic ties and the fact that several founding members’ professional
affiliations do not make their research methods “proprietary,” there are several published papers
detailing the results of behavioral interventions in Philadelphia. The authors’ academic affiliation
does not necessarily undermine the fact that they have the same incentive as an ideas42 staff
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member to exaggerate the success of their nudge units, but the rigorous standards of peerreviewed academic journals would prevent an author from advancing false claims. In a 2018
piece in the Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, for example, Syon Bhanot writes about
an education intervention he researched with Gordon Kraft-Todd, David Rand, and Erez Yoeli of
Yale’s Applied Cooperation Team. 107 The results detailed in this academic article, even if they
are more modest, are more meaningful than any result published in a BIT or ideas42 annual
report because they faced a higher burden of scrutiny.
Although PBSI has a very unique structure and independence from a third-party
consultancy, PBSI’s methodology generally aligns with that of other municipal nudge units. Like
ideas42, PBSI touches on its process via a published “Project Map” that lays out the timeline of
its partnerships and behavioral trials. 108 After initial conversations between PBSI researchers and
individuals from the Mayor’s Office of Policy, the PBSI team assesses the opportunity for new
behavioral initiatives and scopes out academic partners whose expertise is most closely aligned
with the policy area. The academics then work with the City department to devise the goals, data,
and information that needs to be shared for the project, along with gauging interest in writing up
the results of the potential study to publish. Throughout the process, the department is likely to
need to share information with PBSI, which necessitates that the City’s Law Department draft a
Data Licensing Agreement for the project. After PBSI comes up with the design for the RCT
itself, there is another layer of external evaluation where the project requires approval from the
IRB of whatever institution the involved academics are associated with. Health related projects
also require the approval of the City of Philadelphia’s Health IRB. From that point, the City
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department initiates the RCT with the support of the PBSI members, collects data throughout the
project’s duration, and shares that data with the academics to conduct analysis. PBSI ultimately
shares its analysis and project results with the City department and the Mayor’s Policy Office to
review, along with any written content that may be published about the project.
As the only nudge unit of its kind, it is difficult to draw broader conclusions about
independently run nudge units based on observations from PBSI. At least in its own case, PBSI
demonstrates that there is an alternative model to depending on consultancies to design and
implement behavioral interventions. With a supportive mayor, it is possible to directly employ
behavioral economics experts and staff the nudge unit with city employees. Interestingly, this
staffing model may only work in larger cities, or cities near enough to large research universities
that there are academics who can work full or part-time in aiding the nudge unit. However, this
office organization may leave a nudge unit like PBSI more vulnerable to closure with a change
of administration, if the nudge unit’s staff gained a connotation as members of that mayor’s
administration and policy agenda. Meanwhile, an ideas42-partnered nudge unit has the benefits
of outside funding and outside staffing, making it more likely that an incoming mayor will not
dismantle the partnership that was only nominally connected to his or her predecessor. Until
there are other nudge units of this nature, though, it will be impossible to draw absolute
conclusions about their relative success and stability.

Going Global (and Local): BIT Expands to Midsize US Cities
While Philadelphia, New York City, and Chicago are the most established nudge units
with the broadest project portfolios, BIT is showing smaller cities that it is possible to
experiment with a small number of behavioral interventions without setting up an entire nudge
unit. After undergoing the transformation into a social purpose organization, the Behavioral
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Insights Team broadened its portfolio to include a number of U.S. cities. In its current capacity, it
functions as a consultancy similar to ideas42, collaborating with cities who have achieved
philanthropic support to start their own nudge units. According to a BIT report from late 2016 on
“Behavioral Insights for Cities,” the organization’s New York Office led over 25 trials across
U.S. cities in Chattanooga, San Jose, Louisville, Denver, Lexington, and New Orleans. 109 The
initiative has since expanded and more recent blog posts on the BIT website refer to over 35
cities being involved in the project.
Like ideas42, BIT partnerships with cities are largely reliant on philanthropic funds to
pay for their team and the administration of the behavioral intervention. Bloomberg
Philanthropies’ funded the initial launch What Works Cities program (WWC), via a $42 million
investment granted to BIT in 2015 to better incorporate data and evidence in the policy making
of America’s midsize cities.110 According to its website, WWC is an initiative tailored toward
helping local government residents’ lives by using data and evidence effectively to tackle
pressing policy challenges. WWC maintains partnerships with other organizations including
Results for America and the Harvard Kennedy School Government Performance Lab, and their
partnership with BIT helped launch BIT’s American operation in New York City, tailored
around improving government services in cities with at least 30,000 residents.
With a different model from that of nudge units in Chicago, New York City, and
Philadelphia, BIT launched a distinct initiative to apply its in-house talent to affect a large
number of small cities who shared similar goals to implement behavioral interventions. So long
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as a city had a reasonably sized population (in the tens of thousands), BIT considered partnering
to “encourage people to use public services; make government requests of residents as effective
as possible; and build a stronger municipal workforce.” 111 BIT’s 2016 reports details various
project designs that applied behavioral insights to systems of municipal governance, with the
main objectives being to improve the take-up of services, build the best government workforce,
and make government requests more effective. With much smaller budgets and shorter time
frames, BIT adopted these three primary objectives for its small-town initiatives to optimize its
resources and assure that the collaborations would address the cities’ needs. Across its tested
interventions, BIT self-reports a 75% success rate. 112 Amongst its successes, BIT counts a $13$90 return on investment for a project deployed in Lexington and Chattanooga to use a letter
accompanying unpaid sewer bills, a tripling of the number of police applicants, an increase of
67% of Denver businesses filing taxes online, and 150 more people signing up for preventative
healthcare appointments in New Orleans. 113
Comparing and Critiquing the Municipal Models
While PBSI’s process largely aligns with that of Ideas42, one notable distinction is the
lack of IRB approval in the ideas42 methodology. Matt Hankin, an Associate at ideas42 staffed
on the New York City behavioral design team, acknowledged that no project to his knowledge
had been evaluated by an external review board before being implemented. 114 While every
project he’d worked on was a product of collaboration between ideas42 and agencies within New
York City government, the overseeing agency was the only party who could have claimed
“Behavioral Insights for Cities,” (New York City, NY: The Behavioral Insights Team/What Works Cities,
October, 2016). Accessible at: https://www.bi.team/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Behavioral-Insights-for-Cities2.pdf
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responsibility for maintaining the ethical standards for the behavioral trials at the heart of
ideas42’s work. While Hankin could not recall any city agency rejecting project proposal for an
ethical overreach, he suggested that an agency could object to following through with a project
that ideas42 set forth. Meanwhile, PBSI’s work is more directly tied in with the Philadelphiaarea academics that consult on their projects, leaving the majority of their projects subject to
approval from an independent panel coordinated through the university where the consulting
professor is affiliated.
Outside of the variation in approval methods and ethical standards, the three nudge units
also reveal distinctions in the type of relationship they have with the city where their work is
done. PBSI appears to be most closely linked to the municipal administration. At some point,
each nudge unit received the endorsement of their city’s mayor, and each time their funding
needs to be renewed they will again need mayoral approval of their continued work. However,
the third-party operation of most of America’s municipal nudge units and one-off behavioral
intervention initiatives speaks to the lack of involvement from local government. Although
managing the workload of designing the nudge units may not warrant full staff members
assigned to nudge units from the office of the mayor.
With future data on the relative success of these nudge units, and a deeper understanding
about their approval ratings in their communities, future researchers could help distinguish other
benefits and drawbacks of the alternative models. Additionally, it would be helpful to understand
the relative costs associated with each nudge unit, particularly with regard to the partnership fees
collected by ideas42 and BIT. With that information, cities considering nudge units of their own
could more holistically compare the consultant-driven nudge unit to the independent office and
the occasional partnership. Ultimately, relying on outside experts versus a city’s own staff is the
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main distinction, and for now cities must decide who they wish to trust with their behavioral
interventions.
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Chapter 6: The Future of Nudge: Nudging in the Smart City
Both academics and public officials predict that the biggest opportunity for the expansion
of nudges lies in the combination of behavioral insights and big data. Unlike traditional
nudges, which apply general psychological principles to predict why individuals
systematically make irrational decisions, data-driven nudges can rely on big data and
machine learning to isolate exactly who is making which irrational decision. Then, datadriven nudges use the established insight to better target their nudges toward the people and
environments most disposed toward the behavioral intervention. When it comes to
understanding the machinations of nudges that smart cities deploy, Sofia Ranchordás
explains that “[i]nstead of hunches, assumptions or evidence gathered in experiments, big
datasets containing processed details on citizens’ most likely behavior establish correlations
between multiple sources of information.” 115 Now that nudge units can design behavioral
interventions based upon citizens’ data, city officials and the leading administrators of
municipal nudge units must address new ethical questions about privacy and government
overreach. While big data and machine learning tools should not be prohibited from
behavioral interventions, the level of privacy intrusion they entail should require that
behavioral design teams inform individuals how they use their data to nudge.
To understand the gravity of introducing smart-city variations of nudges, it is worth
defining smart cities and describing which smart innovations can overlap with nudges.
Though no single definition captures the universal understanding of the smart city, since
academics, businesspeople, and politicians define the term differently, Rob Kitchin helpfully
outlines the methods that most smart cities have used to incorporate information and
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communication technologies (ICTs) into their design. 116 For Kitchin, Smart Cities rely on
“pervasive and ubiquitous computing and digitally instrumented devices built into the very
urban environments…that are used to monitor, manage and regulate city flows and processes,
often in real time.”117 To gather this information and inform ‘smart’ nudges, choice architects
incorporate Internet-of-Things (IoT) technology, information communications technology
(ICT), big data, or artificial intelligence/machine learning technology. 118 The nudges that
stem from these tools can be utilized to promote civic engagement, innovation and
sustainability more effectively than traditional nudges. However, their complexity and
reliance on personal information poses an increased ethical risk that can threaten the longterm popularity of nudges in municipal politics.
Apart from its involvement in nudges, using so-called smart innovations to collect big
data is a contentious topic among urbanists. Smart city technology is generally capable of
capturing physical data from passersby and digital data from users of a city’s wireless
telecommunications network, digitally controlled utility services, and smart public
transportation systems (like metro tap cards). Additionally, smart cities can benefit from
accessing smart phone computing data that reveals how citizens navigate a particular urban
environment and interact with municipal governments. Depending on the terms and
conditions of a certain mobile phone application, governments can purchase de-identified
individuals’ data from map apps, shopping apps, and the like to better understand how and
when individuals make certain decisions and engage in certain activities. Generally, the three
most frequent behaviors captured in real-time are environmental conditions, movement, and
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engagement with government services, and these present the main opportunities to introduce
nudges to smart cities.
Considering that nudges are designed to encourage individuals to make a certain
decision, nudges are not only compatible but a natural extension of the smart city. In a 2019
piece by Sofia Ranchordás in the International Review of Law, Computers and Technology,
she discusses the growing applications of digital technology and data science to behavioral
insights, which Ranchordás and earlier scholars refer to as hypernudging. 119 In policymakers’
pursuit to hypernudge, “citizens are regarded as passive data subjects whose data is put at the
service of the functioning of the urban center and its infrastructures.” 120 By utilizing this data
to better understand citizens’ habits, behavioral design teams can implement even more
highly predictive nudges. As an emblematic example, Ranchordás discusses the combination
of sensors deployed to identify high-crime neighborhoods with lighting adjustments to nudge
citizens toward walking the safest routes through Eindhoven, a town in the Netherlands.
However, Ranchordás suggests that nudges can quickly compound with the “inherently
paternalistic mission of smart cities” and introducing big data to the equation is likely to
enable more intrusive nudges. 121
As compared to traditional nudges, hypernudges rely on a growing body of personalized
(though generally de-identified) in a way that can make citizens uncomfortable. The
hypernudge, as explored by Karen Yeung of the Centre for Technology, Ethics, Law &
Society at King’s College London, algorithmic decision-guidance techniques are being used
to “shape the informational choice context in which individual decision-making occurs, with
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the aim of channeling attention and decision-making in directions preferred by the ‘choice
architect.’”122 Yeung categorizes hypernudges as retooling either automated decision-making
processes or digital decision-guidance processes, and if individuals are not aware when their
government is hypernudging them, they certainly do not know which process is being
influenced. Although hypernudges can still be classified as a ‘soft’ form of design-based
control because they still do not mandate or prohibit, they invite a deeper level of
governmental interference. These datasets capture individual and vehicle moment across
cities—in many cases, time-stamped to identify when areas are most heavily trafficked—
along with measurements about air quality, sound pollution, crime occurrences, sales
transactions, and shipping patterns. The external mechanism for influencing behavior may be
largely similar (notifications, public awareness campaigns, and removing friction from
certain choices), but the underlying intelligence takes the shape of “algorithmic analysis of
data streams from multiple sources claiming to offer predictive insights concerning the
habits, preferences and interests of targeted individuals.” 123 To illustrate the implications of
this mechanism in a non-governmental context, hypernudges reflect the difference between a
grocer placing the unhealthiest foods in the most difficult to find spots, and a grocer moving
the foods only when an overweight person walks into the store. By specifying the style of a
nudge or its target audience based on behavioral data, choice architects can optimize their
resources and reserve their nudges for the individuals most vulnerable to a particular
irrationality.
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Through shaping nudges at this stage of their design, big data and predictive algorithms
can enable nudges units to implement behavioral interventions that reconfigure an
individual’s choice architecture in real time. This means that in addition to honing in on a
particular subject for a nudge, hypernudges allow choice architects to adjust the intervention
mechanism to best address their mode of decision making. To use data for this purpose,
Yeung explains that cities can 1) adjust the individual’s choice environment in reaction to
changes in the subject’s behavior and the surrounding environment, 2) relay data feedback to
the choice architect, 3) continually track and refine of the individual’s choice environment as
population-wide trends shift.124 In the private sector, hypernudges can take the shape of
follow-up emails or notifications asking if website visitors are sure they don’t want to
purchase the items they had added to their cart. In the public sector, hypernudges can be
similar individualized messages asking individuals if they realize they are taking a particular
subway line at the busiest time of day or prompting individuals from a certain zip code to
apply for benefits that most people in their area are eligible for. The content of these
messages could look different for men and women, young and old, employed and
unemployed. The messages could even be transmitted differently based on data about how
receptive certain groups are to calls versus texts, emails versus subway ads or public
billboards.
When it comes to the evaluation stage, hypernudges have the added advantage of more
acute tracking strategies to judge their progress. A hypernudge designed to reduce foot traffic
at a certain time can use the same sensory data to see if it worked, and in what neighborhoods
or contexts it worked most effectively. Since “smart cities and nudges [both] aim at
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welfaristic ideals and offer an alternative for a better, wiser, more sustainable and healthier
life,” the benign ends will likely be used to justify the suspect means.125 Because there is not
currently much overlap between smart city critics and behavioral intervention critics, the
methods of data collection involved in hypernudges will be approved or rejected long before
choice architects are presented with the opportunity to make use of them. At that point, it
would be irrational for the staff of a nudge unit to ignore the opportunity to enrich a project
with location-specific data, even if the citizens who had tacitly approved of the datacollection mechanism were never made aware that it may be used to nudge them.
Given these opportunities to target irrationality-prone individuals, tailor the intervention
to their mode of thinking, and acutely measure the efficacy of a behavioral intervention,
hypernudges are undoubtedly a powerful tool in need of thoughtful regulation. Regarding the
interaction of the internet of things with behavioral interventions, Christian Iaione, Elena de
Nictolis, and Anna Berti Suman express the need for “Tech Justice” in the city to guide
policy maker’s use of technology. In their forthcoming article in Law and Ethics of Human
Rights, they describe Tech Justice as “a tool for facilitating and sharing information and build
capabilities that are necessary for the urban wellbeing.”126 Under this conception of Tech
Justice, there is an evident gap in the academic literature and popular conversation
surrounding smart cities, which does not pay significant attention to issues of fairness,
democracy, social and economic justice across vulnerable minorities and disadvantaged
population.127 While some smart cities have facilitated conversations around privacy and
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consent, cities with only a few smart innovations here and there tend to keep quiet on the
introduction of the new technology. To remedy this failure, particularly where smart
innovations combine with nudges, civic leaders need to pay greater attention to access and
distribution of digital infrastructure and citizen participation in the design and oversight of
digital initiatives. Once there are democratic mechanisms in place to facilitate this
conversation between community members and civic leaders, leaders should turn their
attention to creating opportunities for co-management or co-ownership of smart city
initiatives among a diversity of local stakeholders. Even if these mechanisms slow the initial
uptake of smart innovations and hypernudges, in the long run they will serve as a check on
choice architects with access to individuals’ personal data.
Granted, these democratic mechanisms hardly exist in nudge units today, and it is fair to
question whether civic leaders have the political will to forgo speed and stealth for
democracy and transparency. In criticizing data-driven or IoT-inspired nudges, Yeung toys
with this fear and poses a “liberal manipulation critique of nudge,” outlining three risks of
illegitimate motives, deceptive methods, and insufficiently transparent mechanisms. 128 Given
the technical complexity of nudges, it is increasingly likely that citizens and their
representatives will cease to understand the behavioral interventions being imposed on them
once big data is incorporated into behavioral interventions. Richard Brauneis and Ellen P.
Goodman demonstrate the reality of this risk through case studies of machine learning and
algorithmic thinking to policymaking, published in the Yale Law Journal of Technology and
Policy. Their piece, “Algorithmic Transparency and the Smart City,” points to examples like
predictive policing, data-based child welfare assessments, and teachers evaluations as three
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realms where quantifiable progress led policy-makers to rely on algorithms to make policy
decisions on their behalf.129 As Brauneis and Goodman demonstrate, the trouble comes when
policy makers do not understand the algorithm’s politics, whether it actually enhances or
diminishes government capacity, and whether the lack of documentation and suppositions of
“trade secrets” prevent citizens from being able to access the necessary information to
evaluate and critique the algorithm’s decision-making process. As potential remediating
measures, governments implement contract language to require the disclosure of records,
specific predictive criteria to prevent algorithmic replication of human biases, and validations
studies and audits to affirm the algorithms perform as intended.
While the complexity of data-driven nudges is a surmountable hurdle, eliminating their
discriminatory potential would be a more difficult task. The former would require an
investment in technical expertise amongst public officials and civic education for the general
populace, but the latter would require unpacking policy makers’ biases and ensuring that they
do not taint the algorithms involved in behavioral interventions. As mathematician and
former hedge fund employee Cathy O’Neil argues in Weapons of Math Destruction,
“[m]odels are opinions embedded in mathematics,” and human-design algorithms perpetuate
our biases rather than overcoming them. 130 Using a mix of federal, state, and local examples
to make her argument, O’Neil concludes that recent implementations of machine learning to
the policy landscape has led to immense grassroots failures, like superintendents who are
unable explain why an algorithm recommended firing more teachers from low-income
schools than not, or parole algorithms that allow historical recidivism data to racially bias
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their predictions. If cities allow their behavioral interventions to be informed by big data and
predictive algorithms that incorporate our assumptions about how different races and
socioeconomic classes behave differently, then municipal nudge units risk perpetuating the
same discriminatory beliefs that constrain minorities today.
Despite these risks of obscure and discriminatory hypernudges, the bar for dismissing
hypernudges outright should be incredibly high because of the potential checks against
government abuse. Moreover, it is possible hypernudges sound more intrusive than they are,
and that their critics are too quick to assume bad intentions on the part of choice architects. In
a conception like Yeung’s, it is easy to see why “the extensive and accelerating use of
commercially driven Big Data analytic techniques may seriously erode our capacity for
democratic participation and individual flourishing.” 131 However, the question of this chapter
is whether the introduction of big data would make traditional nudges unjustifiably prone
toward undermining individual liberties. To best understand this risk, it may be helpful to
compare the smart behavioral interventions outlined in this chapter to the recent scandal
surrounding Cambridge Analytica. As a political consulting organization, Cambridge
Analytica’s essential mission is the same as that of every advertising agency on Madison
Avenue—to influence people. What made Cambridge Analytica’s activities so scandalous
and worthy of public outcry, then, could not have been the mere fact that its staff members
advised campaigns about the best language and messaging styles to change the political
hearts and minds of voters. Campaign advisors have sought to sway voters for generations,
using television ads to do so since the 1950s. 132 What seemed to inspire the collective ire
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against Cambridge Analytica is that they (relatively covertly) captured online user data to
create psychological profiles of thousands of Americans, and then used those profiles as a
sample to determine which Americans would be most susceptible to certain formats of
political messaging. Then, like a hypernudge, the array of political advertisements that
Cambridge Analytica recommended targeted the individuals most amenable to the respective
forms of persuasion. Interestingly, Yeung refers to an earlier Facebook scandal from 2014,
where the company itself manipulated nearly 700,000 users’ news feeds, as an example of a
so-called study that can advance an “illegitimate motive” like emotional manipulation via a
data-driven behavioral intervention.133
As to whether the risks of illegitimate motives, deceptive methods, and insufficiently
transparent mechanisms are avoidable, one should be skeptical that even strict oversight or
notice and consent requirements are capable of mitigating the risks associated with
hypernudges. On the one hand, individuals could be able to choose how their personal data is
used, including whether it is used by a municipal behavioral design team. Alternatively, a
more collective form of privacy management like a data trust could approve or reject a
request to use a city’s data for a certain purpose. In either case, the empirical evidence from
the technology sphere reveals that individuals are rarely aware of the terms they consent to
regarding their own data and its online transmission.134 Given these realities, it is up to
citizens and their representatives to decide whether they wish to accept behavioral
interventions rooted in guesses about their habits and though processes while rejecting
interventions designed with the intimate knowledge of those processes. In any case, choice
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architects cannot ignore the fact that there is a meaningful difference between nudges and
hypernudges, a difference that carries a greater opportunity for government abuse and
manipulation that nudges specifically promise to displace.
While smart cities have proven to be rapidly evolving projects that tend to seek more
input and inspiration from the private sector than the public sector, and intertwining nudges
with their innovations threatens to tarnish nudges with a similar reputation. 135 From the range
of critiques directed toward hypernudges, there is no question that policy makers must
approach the introduction of big data to nudge units quite carefully. Without proper
oversight, choice architects could use smart city technologies to unfairly discriminate against
vulnerable populations, abuse data that is not properly de-identified, and undermine the
liberty of citizens who do not wish for policy makers to use knowledge of their habits against
them. The potential, however, for hypernudges to be more effective and resource-efficient
than traditional nudges cannot be forgotten. Given the pace of progress and the expansion of
smart city technologies with or without the support of nudge units, citizens and their
representatives should take the lead in discussing how to responsible incorporate big data and
machine learning into behavioral interventions.
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Chapter 7: Evaluating Nudge Units: What We Need to Know to Nudge Better
As the municipal applications of Nudge span a greater number of policy realms and
involve increasingly specific and personalized big data, the ethical concerns with nudges and
the choice architects behind them will only intensify. Given these ethical concerns, and the
accompanying practical concerns regarding the execution of different iterations of nudges,
behavioral design teams should be more explicit about their objectives and the metrics by
which they evaluate their initiatives. Because no critique of nudge units or even a particular
nudge is objectively true and insurmountable, civic leaders should turn to the members of
their communities to decide for themselves which nudges they support. Moreover,
individuals must decide for themselves how to measure success and whether they are
satisfied with the early progress of the nudge units in their communities.
The first step in facilitating this democratic forum will require much greater transparency
from nudge units about their spending, their goals, and their success. Since many of the
initial grants that helped launch America’s nudge units will soon need to be renewed or
replaced by government funding, both donors and taxpayers would benefit from independent
reviews of municipal nudge units and their effectiveness. It is this lack of academic literature
on nudge units’ early progress that made it impossible to write a prescriptive analysis of what
strategies make nudges succeed. Having completed several years of projects to establish a
track record, nudge units ought to be willing to share that information with academics or
researchers not affiliated with the behavioral consultancies. By publicly clarifying their
methods and metrics for success, and by sharing their project outcomes with independent
researchers, nudges can attempt overcome the empirical and philosophical critiques levied by
scholars like Glaeser. Moreover, this clarity is necessary to arm citizens with the information
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to advocate for or against nudge units and to determine whether to limit their scope of
influence as more data and machine learning tools become accessible to behavioral scientists
and policymakers.
When it comes to affirming certain objectives and clarifying their methods, several nudge
units have aligned themselves with different commitments. In Inside the Nudge Unit, Halpern
explains that BIT’s original metric for success was saving the UK government more money
than it was costing it within the first two years of launching.136 Short of meeting that goal,
Halpern assures his readers, the original nudge unit would have willingly shuttered its
operation. Neither ideas42, nor BIT, nor PBSI have publicly committed their nudge units to
earning a certain amount of revenue (either in absolute terms or in relation to their
costliness), but all three organizations have suggested that their nudges do save or earn
money for the municipalities. Of course, financial aims should not be the sole, or even
primary, purpose of a nudge unit, but it is more than reasonable to request that nudge units
are transparent about their costs and demonstrated benefits. Especially when considering the
involvement of consultancies like BIT and ideas42, who charge for their services, making
cost data available for entire nudge units and one-off nudge initiatives would help public
officials across the country determine whether nudges could be wise financial endeavors for
their municipalities. Both voters, nonprofit donors supporting nudge units, and public
officials with and without nudge units in their cities would benefit from transparent financial
data on the costs and revenue-generating potential of nudge units.
While financial gains are certainly one metric for evaluation, and perhaps a common
consideration for government initiatives, evaluations for municipal nudge units should also
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consider the units’ democratic accountability to citizens and whether there are social
scientific standards in place to evaluate the effectiveness of their nudges. Apart from stating
financial objectives and committing to a certain level of revenue generation, nudge units
should consider whether their methods and outcomes are satisfactory to the citizens being
nudged. On this front, Cass Sunstein’s article “Do People Like Nudge?” uses survey data
from 536 Americans to make six conclusions about the extent to which citizens find nudges
acceptable uses of government authority.137 Though Sunstein acknowledges that “empirical
findings about people’s answers are not decisive” when it comes to resolving ethical
questions in principle, it is worth noting citizens’ perspectives because “in a democratic
society, it is inevitable that public officials will attend to what citizens actually think.”138 On
the subject of nudges, Sunstein finds that individuals generally have neither positive nor
negative views, about nudging as a broader concept, and their approval of specific nudges
hinges on whether they agree with that nudge’s intended purpose and practical outcomes. 139
Sunstein’s survey reveals that individuals are likely to disapprove of nudges that “promote
what they see as illicit goals [such as economic losses] or (b) are perceived as inconsistent
with either the interests or values of most choosers.” While citizen approval is certainly a
potential evaluative mechanism, and nudge units ought to take the citizen perspective into
consideration, it is perhaps unhelpful for nudge units to commit themselves to pursue
initiatives consistent with the interests of most choosers. One would assume that nudge units
have this goal already, though providing citizens with a mechanism to state their values or
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respond to more specific surveys on their local nudge unit would make this commitment
more meaningful.
Although seeking consent for any given nudge unit may be an unreasonable goal,
allowing individuals to retroactively review and critique nudges they have been subject to
could help inform future nudges would help nudge units and citizens in the long-term. By
doing so, nudge units will secure their own reputation and increase their chance of securing
government funding in the future, while citizens will be able to influence their nudge units to
pursue behavioral interventions that suit their values and interests. When it comes to
understanding types of nudge units that citizens overwhelmingly support, or at least approve
of, Sunstein’s survey is again helpful in identifying popular nudges as calorie labels (87% in
favor), graphic warnings on cigarettes (74% in favor), and mandatory enrollment in savings
plans (71% in favor, though 80% support encouraged enrollment).140 Educational campaigns
designed to combat childhood obesity, distracted driving, and discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation received widespread approval, though approval ratings dropped to 57% for
a seemingly “aggressive” public education campaign that sought to combat obesity by
showing obese children struggling to exercise. Twelve nudges, however, were widely
disapproved, seven of which involved uses of default rules. Specifically, unpopular nudges
included a state law assuming men would automatically change their last names to that of
their wives upon getting married (subject to opt-out); a policy assuming that individuals wish
to register as Democrats, unless people explicitly ask to register as Republicans or
Independent; and a government initiative to default state employees into giving 20 dollars per
month to the United Way, subject to opt-out. From these findings, one can gather that the
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mechanism of changing defaults tends to be more unpopular than nudges that seek to inform.
Additionally, the survey revealed divisions among partisan lines that suggest individuals are
more likely to approve of nudges whose outcomes align with their political views. By
deepening our understanding of individuals’ outlook on different nudges, cities can better
position their nudge units to serve their citizens interests without upsetting them.
Even if one wishes to largely dismiss the significance of Sunstein’s survey result because
of his admission that “people do not value autonomy or dignity highly enough, or perhaps
they do not quite know what those concepts means,” the criticism is not tantamount to a
solution about who should instead decide when nudges are overly intrusive. 141 Currently, the
individuals making that decision are behavioral scientists advising the nudge units, who may
or may not be influenced by other practitioners, political scientists, and philosophers’ writing
on the subject. While they may be more informed as to the specific definitions of political
autonomy individual dignity, their subjective stances on nudges are not necessarily reflective
of the majority’s views.
At this point, public officials have mainly endorsed certain nudges—despite the
occasional critical government employee—but officials should take advantage of their
political knowledge and proximity to nudge units to become more engaged critics of their
practices. When it comes to democratic accountability, existing municipal nudge units in
America are largely shielded from transparency requirements and citizen input. While any
given nudge unit’s political fate does lie in the hands of a city’s mayor, whose failure to be
reelected could spell the end of the nudge unit, there is no evidence that pushback for any
nudge unit has been sufficient to oust the mayor. Instead, nudge units tend to sustain
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themselves off of the extra-governmental financial support led by large nonprofit
organizations, and this reliance on third-party funds suggests that nudge units could have
their focus areas or methods catered toward the goals of the nonprofit rather than the best
interests of the municipality. To introduce greater accountability into nudge units, cities
could require that a deputy mayor or other ranked public official be in charge of the office,
rather than leaving the operations of nudge units wholly at the hands of staff members from
ideas42 or BIT. As discussed in Chapter 4, the nudge units in New York City and Chicago
are wholly staffed by ideas42, and the nudges launched across the country by the behavioral
insights team are likewise overseen by their own staff members. Rather than relying on
public officials solely for funding and sporadic project approvals, mayors could assign a
deputy mayor to join the staff of their municipal nudge units, or they could set up the entire
office such that they are partnered with a municipal division like an Economic Development
Corporation. By associating a public employee with the nudge unit, mayors will be forced to
more directly acknowledge their endorsement of the nudge unit and its initiatives. If citizens
come to criticize the nudge unit’s methodology or a particular initiative later on, a mayor will
be more accountable for the nudge unit’s error with a member of his or her own staff
associated with the unit.
Apart from the introduction of much-needed government oversight to municipal nudge
units, there is also a pressing need for clearer ethical standards about behavior-changing
policy in the first place. Depending on one’s philosophy toward government intervention in
the first place, nudges may be broadly regarded as completely benign or completely
inconsistent with individual liberties. For a critic of behavioral interventions, nudges
inherently undermine autonomy, and no commitment to transparency or choice-preservation
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will be ethically restorative. For a nudge advocate like Sunstein, meanwhile, the benefits of
behavioral interventions may make him hesitant to impose blanket restrictions on nudge units
by binding them to any particular commitment. Setting philosophy aside, nudges are a type
of policy that can inspire a certain gut reaction from individuals, so nudge units ought to
invest more time and effort in defining their own ethical standards and publicizing their
commitment to following those standards to community members. Particularly given the
complexity of data-driven nudges, it is essential for nudge units to establish whether they
wish to use real-time data to inform their nudges, and how individual data will be depersonalized or de-identified to protect individuals’ privacy rights. On a more basic level,
nudge units face publicly unresolved ethical questions about how they will address
behavioral irrationalities that only affect certain subpopulations. It should not be taken as a
given that nudge units can primarily interfere with low-income or lesser-educated residents
of a city, even if vulnerable populations are the primary victims of behavioral irrationalities
that equate to the “low-hanging” fruit most easily and cheaply addressed by a behavioral
intervention.
Further insights from Sunstein’s study, such as citizens’ distaste for covert nudges that
hinge on subconscious manipulation, can help behavioral interventionists design nudges that
neither offend nor anger their subjects. 142 Felsen et al. adds to this survey finding in
observing that in a scenario involving eating, people were equally approving of System 1 and
System 2 nudges when they wanted help.143 While I have yet to come across a nudge that is
only applied to individuals already seeking to motivate a behavioral change, Felsen and
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Sunstein’s findings about the disparate reception of conscious and subconscious nudges
should be interesting to designers of behavioral interventions. Because of these design-based
opinions, some scholars suggest focusing more attention on defining nudges rather than
laying out constraints and ethical requirements for nudge units to abide by. Sunstein, for
instance, argues that “most nudges are fully transparent, and all of them should be;” by way
of explanation, he suggests that nudges relying on disclosure, reminders, warnings, and uses
of social norms actually need to be transparent to work.144
As for the evaluative stage of the project timeline, municipal nudge units also tend to lack
transparency surrounding their own standards for success. Whereas public officials make
campaign promises and face subsequent public and media scrutiny around their progress
toward achieving these promises, all a spectator can gather about nudge units in this sense is
that their progress has sufficiently pleased their funders and overseers in the government who
allow them to continue doing their work. Nudge units do not publicize what rate of behavior
change is necessary to advance any given pilot project to the scaling stage, nor do they
comment on what overall success rate they aim to reach across their portfolio of projects in
any given city.
While agreeing to metrics regarding statistical significance or office success may not be
meaningful to the random citizen who visits the website of their local behavioral design
team, a commitment to achieving a quantifiable goal would give individuals from the media
or political realms a better starting point to evaluate nudge units. To create some sense of
external validity, too, a more reliable trove of research on nudge units’ success would help
cities without nudge units decide whether they are worth investing in. Although it may be a
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lot to ask of city-run nudge units to commit to standards and closely track their progress,
these expectations are certainly reasonable for larger organizations like BIT and ideas42 who
each have several staff members with social science backgrounds assigned to each nudge
unit.
Until there is more independently verified reporting on the progress of municipal nudge
units, the best reforms available to citizens now are the ethical standards, community review,
and transparency requirements outlined above. Without written commitments to ethical
standards and methodological practices, citizens should be skeptical of whether their nudge
units are preserving their liberty and adequately protecting their data. When it comes to
community review mechanism, the current lack of public conversation around nudge has left
policy makers and behavioral economists largely unaware of whether individuals approve of
their methods. While Sunstein’s contribution to this conversation suggests many helpful
findings about the general approval of nudges and the division amongst partisan lines
surrounding certain nudges, each city may be different in this regard. Some cities may find
majority support of nudges hinges on method, rather than outcome, while other cities may be
even more politically divided on the subject. Only conducting surveys and hosting forums
between nudge units, civic leaders, and citizens will resolve this unknown, and hopefully
citizens will be better off for having the opportunity to shape their municipality’s nudge unit.
Lastly, greater transparency and open data are essential to the continued development of
insights about municipal nudge units. At some point soon, a curious student should be able to
write a thesis on what works and what doesn’t in the context of municipal nudge units, but
for now, the data and academic literature could not support it.
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Conclusion
Until cities outline the rights their citizens have when it comes to behavioral
interventions, or nudge units themselves volunteer greater transparency and opportunities for
citizen involvement, nudges will persist with very little accountability. Having evolved from
the merging of two fields—economics and psychology—and an interdisciplinary scholarly
collaboration of a law professor and an economist, nudges will never lose their academic
associations. However, the curious introduction of non-profit and social-purpose
consultancies to the equation leaves the political champions of nudge uniquely shielded from
blame when behavioral interventions go awry. As nudges grow progressively more complex,
with the increased potential for urban data to predict citizens’ behavior and their responses to
experimental nudges, policy makers are at the risk of becoming even more removed from the
process.
To address the democratic risk that nudges pose, city leaders could shutter nudge units
altogether, add members of their own administration to the staffs populated by the third-party
employees in the cases of Chicago and New York, demand greater transparency and publicly
available data from behavioral design consultancies, or impose greater requirements for pretrial IRB approval or post-trial independent audits of nudge units. The first alternative will
halt the evolution of municipal nudge units and eliminate behavioral interventions as a tool
for policy makers. The second would make nudge units more accountable to citizens, while
ensuring that there is someone with local and political expertise on the team in addition to the
social scientists that tend to staff nudge units. The third would enable more academics to
publish research on nudge units, leaving citizens more informed about what nudges work and
when nudges have proven overly intrusive or ineffective. Even so, latter proposals might not
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fully satisfy critics who wish to dismiss nudges as inherently undermining of individuals’
autonomy, however.
Nudge units’ early efforts, nevertheless, have indicated that they are capable of increasing
individuals’ utility in a variety of realms. In an urban context, nudges can improve the
functioning of local governments by diversifying their staffs, aiding efforts to collect
revenues from taxes and fees issued, and advancing their sustainability objectives by
influencing citizens to use less electricity, water, and fuel. Transparency and accountability
mechanisms, at the very least, will allow citizens to decide for themselves whether they agree
these goals are worthy of the sacrifices they make of their own autonomy.
In the coming years, however, nudge units may need to pick up the slack for civic leaders
lacking in motivation or interest. To preserve their own fate and respect the rights of the
individuals they claim to serve, nudge units can be originators of many of the reforms
proposed to hold them accountable. While regulations are often tinged with the connotation
of restrictions, nudge units have the potential to benefit greatly from reforming themselves to
be more forthcoming with their data and more involving of community members in their
processes of design and review. By publicizing their datasets and specific methodologies
behind each RCT implemented to test a behavioral intervention, nudge units will enable
curious researchers to publish more about nudges in academic journals. Moreover, they will
arm public officials of other cities with a resource that is far more useful than over-simplified
how-to guides like ideas42’s Behavioral Design Team Playbook. Meanwhile, inviting
citizens to be more involved in the design and review of behavioral interventions will give
the staffs of nudge units an even deeper understanding of what interventions work and what
opportunities are being missed in their nudge efforts. Overall, if behavioral design teams and
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other variations of municipal nudge units are as successful and protective of citizens’
interests as they claim to be, then they can only benefit from the popularity and helpful
feedback to be had by choosing to be more transparent and open to citizen involvement.
The risk, of course, is that behavioral design teams like those in New York City, Chicago,
and Philadelphia will fail to meet the high, but vague, expectations placed on them by
mayors’ press releases and prideful local headlines. It is possible that with full disclosure of
their methods and results, nudge units will disappoint the citizens whose tax dollars help fund
their existence. A secondary risk on the part of behavioral design consultancies when it
comes to increased disclosure and community involvement is that they risk their own
revenue source by empowering others to replicate their work in cities that could have become
clients. After all, there is nothing proprietary about nudging or creating offices to deploy
behavioral interventions in cities, and yet BIT and ideas42 continue to grow and add clients
to their portfolios.145 Given these vulnerabilities, it is understandable that a rational
consulting firm would hesitate to voluntarily disclose their data. Nevertheless, with 6-12
years of project results in their portfolios, it is time for behavioral design consultancies to
accept that they have had plenty of time to establish a successful track record of nudging and
allow independent researchers to conduct their own reviews.
If nudge units do not cooperate, citizens and their representatives must to demand
transparency and greater civic engagement. To facilitate this involvement, public officials
also have the responsibility to foster a more inclusive dialogue to retroactively shape the
goals for these nudge units. Ideally, this dialogue would help public officials answer some of
the most essential unanswered policy questions about municipal nudge units. Public officials,
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in conjunction with expert advice from behavioral design consultancies and democratic input
from members of the community must decide whether a successful nudge unit merely pays
for itself by earning the city more revenue than it costs to maintain, or whether a nudge unit
should lead to certain measurable improvements in health, safety, or sustainability.
Moreover, these stakeholders should establish to what degree a nudge must change behavior
to call a success, and how many failures a nudge unit should be allowed before its strategy is
revised. To put nudge units in the best position to serve citizens, policy makers should
communicate the extent of an intervention that citizens are comfortable with in different
policy realm, how often do citizens want their nudge units audited, and how much control
citizens want nudge units to have over their projects without direct public oversight.
The existing research on nudge units suggests that individuals will need more information
before they can come up with satisfactory answers to these questions. The responsibility to
gather this information does not rest on the shoulders of one group, but it is in everyone’s
best interest to continue the discussion. Individuals would be well-served to pressure their
public officials to invest in these research efforts and make data on behavioral interventions
available to researchers. Academics, policymakers, and behavioral science consultancies
themselves will need to collaborate to encourage an initial investment in a wider array of
projects that will shed more light on the capabilities and potential shortcomings of nudge
units. Simultaneously, they ought to invest in civic education to ensure that citizens have the
tools to understand their approach and the access to be involved in their projects. Nudge has
come a long way since being a New York Times bestseller, and one can only imagine that
Thaler and Sunstein would hope that the first decade of nudge experiments they inspired is
followed by a second decade of continued research and reflection on the subject.
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